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Executive Summary 
 
 
Developing a dialogue on how best to revise the current CBM forms, and 
obtaining as many perspectives as possible on this, has been identified as a 
key priority in preparing for the comprehensive review of the CBM mechanism 
at the 2011 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention. 
 
To this end, the Geneva Forum in collaboration with the BIOS Centre of the 
London School of Economics, and together with the Governments of 
Switzerland, Norway and Germany, hosted a series of three workshops on 
options and proposals to revise the CBM mechanism. The first of these was 
held in Jongny-sur-Vevey on 22-23 August 2009, the second in Geneva on 12 
December 2009, and the third in Berlin on 26-27 April 2010.  
 
This report summarizes the workshop discussions, by, firstly, providing an 
extensive summary of the expert presentations made at each workshop and 
of the debates that ensued; and, secondly, reflecting on the broader themes 
and points of agreement that arose over the course of the three workshops. 
Key themes included the purpose of the CBM mechanism; the relatively low 
level of participation; the changing political, security and scientific contexts; 
improvements to the content of the existing CBM forms; potential procedural 
changes to the CBM mechanism; and the role of civil society. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The Confidence Building Measures (CBM) mechanism was set up to establish 
transparency and trust between States Parties to the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) that no activities are taking place in contravention of the 
Convention. Developing out of the crisis of confidence among States that had 
resulted from unresolved allegations of non-compliance, rapid developments 
in science and technology and other pressures in the early 1980s, the CBMs 
were conceived, developed and agreed at a time when it seemed a 
verification mechanism was going to be put in place that resembled the 
declarations and on-site inspections of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
Much has changed since that time. A verification mechanism was never put in 
place for the BWC and is not currently within political reach. New threats, risks 
and security challenges have emerged since the end of the Cold War. 
Significant advances in the biological and life sciences, coupled with 
knowledge and technology becoming increasingly available, accessible and 
affordable, have increased the potential for misuse by a wider range and by a 
larger number of ‘wrong hands.’ New security actors have come in that claim 
an interest in the biological weapons problem – there are now not only groups 
associated with war, defence, international order and strategy involved, but 
also groups concerned with crime, internal security, public order and police 
investigations as well as groups concerned with medicine, healthcare and the 
life sciences. The nature and practice of diplomacy have also changed, from a 
model where participation was exclusive rather than inclusive, with diplomats 
acting as gatekeepers rather than facilitators, and with relations being 
hierarchical rather than network-based, to one that can be characterised as 
‘multistakeholder diplomacy’ and which adopts a governance approach to 
regulation.  
 
The biological weapons problem today is thus not about ‘disarmament’ or 
‘arms control’ as traditionally understood, but is rather, as our colleague Jez 
Littlewood has noted, a “post-disarmament issue which requires 
‘management’ or ‘governance’ by a collection of both connected and 
unconnected measures.” It is therefore pertinent to revisit the role CBMs play 
in today’s context and to reassess whether the current mechanism still 
represents the best way of increasing transparency and building confidence 
between States Parties. 
 
The December 2008 Meeting of States Parties saw two side events dedicated 
to CBMs. The first of these, jointly hosted by Switzerland and the Geneva 
Forum, launched the final report of a Swiss study that focussed on the kind 
and quality of the information exchanged by States Parties on their CBM 
returns.1 The second side event, jointly hosted by France and UNIDIR, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The event, entitled “Preparing the Ground for the CBM Content Debate: What Information 
Builds Confidence” was held on Tuesday 2 December 2008 at the Palais des Nations. 
Richard Lennane, Head of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, provided an overview of 
the role of the ISU in strengthening CBMs. Filippa Lentzos explored whether, in practice, the 
information supplied on CBM returns enhances transparency and builds the necessary 
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provided a panel discussion on ways to increase the participation of States 
Parties in the CBM mechanism. 2 These side events provided the impetus for 
an informal roundtable discussion between a small number of like-minded 
States and civil society actors about strategies for continued work on CBMs in 
the lead-up to the 2011 Review Conference. 
 
Developing a dialogue on how best to revise the current forms, and obtaining 
as many perspectives as possible on this, was identified as one of the key 
areas where further work would be particularly useful. It was felt that this 
should be a multilateral endeavour and that it would be helpful to convene a 
meeting of experts outside of the BWC intersessional process specifically for 
this purpose. To this end, the Geneva Forum in collaboration with the BIOS 
Centre of the London School of Economics, and together with the 
Governments of Switzerland, Norway and Germany, hosted a series of three 
workshops on options and proposals to revise the CBM mechanism. The first 
of these was held in Jongny-sur-Vevey on 22-23 August 2009, the second in 
Geneva on 12 December 2009, and the third in Berlin on 26-27 April 2010.  
 
Drawing on representatives from governments, intergovernmental 
organisations, civil society and academia, these workshops brought together 
a range of experts to address key questions on: (1) the objectives of the CBM 
mechanism and the extent to which these have been achieved in practice; (2) 
the CBMs in relation to other compliance assessment mechanisms; (3) the 
format and content of the existing CBM forms, and (4) the effectiveness of the 
CBM collation and submission process. Throughout these workshops, the aim 
was to find solutions with the potential to increase both the quantity and the 
quality of CBM declarations. 
 
While workshop participants identified a number of areas for improvement, it 
was the shared belief of all involved that CBMs remain an important aspect of 
the Convention. Thus, rather than proposing an overhaul of the CBM 
mechanism, workshop participants identified proposals aimed at fine-tuning it 
to more effectively capture the information desired by States Parties to build 
confidence in others’ commitment to the Convention. At the root of this 
endeavour, and at the fore of the discussion, were the pragmatic questions: 
What information builds confidence? And, how can CBMs be improved to 
better communicate this information? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
degree of confidence between states parties. Reto Wollenmann, of the Permanent Mission of 
Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament, took a longer-term perspective on CBMs and 
outlined some of the political work ahead. The event was chaired by David Atwood, Director 
of the Quaker UN Office in Geneva and Head of its Disarmament and Peace Programme. 
2 Building on the Tuesday side event, this event was held on Thursday 4 December 2008 and 
was entitled “Universalization of Confidence-Building Measures in the Biological Weapons 
Convention.” Opening remarks were provided by Sophie Moal-Makame of the Permament 
Mission of France to the Conference on Disarmament and by Christiane Agboton Johnson, 
Deputy Director of UNIDIR. Presentations were given by Ngoc Phuong Huynh of the BWC 
Implementation Support Unit, Filippa Lentzos of the London School of Economics, and 
Angela Woodward of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. A summary 
of the debate following the presentations was provided by Elisande Nexon of the Fondation 
pour la Recherche Stratégique. The event had simultaneous interpretation in French and 
English. 
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In what follows we report in detail on the discussions had at these workshops, 
by, firstly, providing an extensive summary of the expert presentations made 
at each workshop and of the debates that ensued; and, secondly, reflecting 
on the broader themes and points of agreement that arose over the course of 
the three workshops. 
 
Appended to the report is: A) the current set of agreed forms for CBM 
submissions; B) a compendium of all formal States Parties proposals and civil 
society recommendations on revisions to the current CBM forms stretching 
back to the Third Review Conference in 1991 when the forms were 
introduced; C) a best judgment document of common ground on technical 
revisions to the CBMs from the workshop series; and D) a list of participants 
who attended the workshops. 
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The CBM Mechanism 
 
 
The aim of the CBM mechanism is to: 
 
strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence 
in the implementation of its provisions… in order to prevent or reduce 
the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to 
improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities. 
 
The exchange of information through CBMs strengthens the regime of 
compliance by enabling States Parties to be transparent about their activities, 
facilities, unusual outbreaks and regulatory frameworks for implementing the 
Convention. Complete, accurate and annual declarations inspire the greatest 
amount of transparency and confidence by enabling national patterns of 
normal activity to be established.  
 
Developing out of the crisis of confidence among States Parties that had 
resulted from the unresolved allegations of non-compliance, rapid 
developments in science and technology and other pressures in the early 
1980s, CBMs were agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986, 
elaborated at a meeting of scientific and technical experts in 1987, and 
modified and considerably expanded at the Third Review Conference in 1991. 
They have not been modified since, although the Sixth Review Conference 
agreed on various improvements to the mechanism for submission and 
distribution. 
 
As agreed at the Third Review Conference, the CBMs consist of seven 
measures (A-G) that are to be submitted using agreed forms to the ISU no 
later than 15 April each year. The complete set of forms is available in 
Appendix A. 
 
CBM A Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories 
Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence 
research and development programmes 
CBM B Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and 
similar occurrences caused by toxins 
CBM C Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of 
knowledge 
CBM D Active promotion of contacts 
CBM E Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures 
CBM F Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes 
CBM G Declaration of vaccine production facilities 
 
 
In accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference, the ISU is 
responsible for compiling and distributing the CBM returns to States Parties. 
The CBM returns are not publicly available (unless a State Party specifically 
requests that its return be made public) and no collective analysis of the 
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submitted data is carried out. The ISU does, however, provide a CBM 
submission summary report. 
 
This summary report indicates that over the last twenty-odd years, the annual 
number of CBM submissions has been somewhere between 30 at its lowest 
(in 1987) and 65 at its highest (in 2007). Annual CBM submissions are thus 
made by substantially less than half, and often less than a third, of States 
Parties to the BWC. This relative lack of participation in the CBM process is 
particularly unfortunate as the mechanism will only command limited 
confidence until more States Parties honour their commitments and submit 
declarations. Indeed, ignoring the mechanism weakens the concept of CBMs 
and may ultimately reduce, rather than build, confidence among States. Non-
participating States Parties are therefore strongly encouraged to take up 
offers of assistance in completing CBM returns from the ISU, the EU and 
individual States Parties. 
 
The relative lack of participation in the CBM mechanism is compounded by 
inconsistent submissions, where States submit returns in some years but not 
in others. For example, 13 States Parties which submitted CBMs in 2009 have 
not yet done so in 2010.3 Hopefully most of these will just be late submitters, 
but the trend suggested over the last few years is that some will simply not 
submit again in 2010. Completing the CBM forms can, of course, be a lengthy 
and difficult exercise, especially the first time it is done. Collecting the 
necessary information typically requires contacting several different 
government ministries and agencies. In larger countries, the necessary 
information may be held at a state or provincial rather than national level, 
further complicating the task. However, there is a wide perception that 
updating information annually takes a small effort once a State has already 
made the effort to collate and submit previous returns.  It is not immediately 
obvious, therefore, why a State Party that has made previous returns or even 
a first return would not simply update its information in following years. 
 
The CBM mechanism not only faces low and inconsistent participation, it is 
also challenged by incomplete submissions where only some of the seven 
forms are submitted. A notably bad year was 1991, for example, in which 
approximately half of the CBM returns submitted were incomplete. In other 
years somewhere between 15-25% of submissions are incomplete. Where 
forms are submitted, they are sometimes only partially filled out, or filled out 
with information that provides little transparency about national programmes 
and activities related to the BWC.  
 
Chart 1 – taken from the Swiss 2007 study National data collection processes 
for CBM submissions – illustrates the annual number of CBM returns 
submitted and the proportion of these that are complete.4 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 ISU website accessed 9 June 2010 and personal communication with ISU 9 June 2010. 
4 Four additional CBM returns were submitted for 2007 after the study went into print. The 
total number of CBM returns for 2007 is thus 65 and not 61 as indicated in the chart.!
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Chart 1: Number of CBM returns submitted by States Parties over the twenty-year timeframe 
1987–2007 and the proportion of these containing all forms. 
 
 
Many States Parties have emphasized a need to review the CBM mechanism 
and consider proposals to improve its deficiencies. The introduction of the 
Implementation Support Unit (ISU), agreed at the Sixth Review Conference in 
2006, signalled a commitment by States Parties to strengthen the mechanism, 
as the ISU is explicitly tasked with administering the CBM process. Although 
the introduction of the ISU represents a significant step forward, there remains 
considerable scope for further improvement. 
 
A compendium of all formal States Parties proposals and civil society 
recommendations on revisions to the current CBM forms is provided in 
Appendix B. The following sections summarize the workshop discussions of 
experts over the last year on the improvements they see necessary to the 
mechanism and the forms. 
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Workshop 1: Substantive Agenda 
 
 
The first workshop was a residential workshop and took place on the 22nd and 
23rd of August 2009 at the Centre de Formation du Léman, Jongny-sur-Vevey 
in Switzerland. The workshop was sponsored by Switzerland. 
 
 
Session I: Contextualising the CBM mechanism 
Chair: Riccarda Torriani 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• When the CBM mechanism was developed for the BWC, how was it 
conceived to fit within the broader context of compliance assessment 
and verification? 
• What were the main considerations affecting the negotiations of the 
CBM modalities? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by brief presentations from Nicholas 
Sims and Roger Roffey. 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• What have been the key strengths of the mechanism and what have 
been its key criticisms? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by a brief presentation from Jez 
Littlewood. 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• How have the political, security, scientific and technological contexts 
changed in the twenty years since the CBM mechanism was 
introduced? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by three short interventions from the 
floor. 
 
 
Session II: Improving the quantity and quality of CBM submissions 
Chair: Reto Wollenmann 
 
Working Group discussions: 
• How can the existing CBM forms, submission process, and data 
access management be improved? 
There were three Working Groups, chaired by Volker Beck, Richard Lennane, 
and Lorna Miller. 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• What state party proposals and civil society recommendations have 
been made to date on revisions to the current CBM forms, and what is 
the value of these proposals? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by a brief presentation from Alex 
Hamilton of the pre-circulated “Compendium of Proposals to Improve the 
CBM Mechanism”, and by feedback from the Working Group chairs. 
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Session III: Reconsidering the current CBMs 
Chair: Silvia Cattaneo 
 
Working Group discussions: 
• If the measures were to be redesigned from scratch, what content 
would be covered? 
The Working Group discussions were followed by feedback from the Working 
Group Chairs in plenary. 
 
 
Session IV: Other elements of compliance assessment 
Chair: David Atwood 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• What other compliance assessment mechanisms are at our disposal 
and how does the CBM mechanism fit with these? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by a brief presentation from Angela 
Woodward. 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• How can civil society play a constructive role in increasing 
transparency and building confidence between states parties? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by a brief presentation from Iris 
Hunger. 
 
 
Session V: Moving forward 
Chair: Reto Wollenmann 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• What role could/should the CBM discussion play at the 2011 Review 
Conference? 
• How can we collectively facilitate a constructive CBM discussion and 
revision process? 
• What needs to be prepared for the 2011 CBM discussion? 
• What are possible outcomes of the 2011 Review Conference with 
regard to CBMs? 
 
 
Summary, next steps and close 
Chair: Knut Langeland 
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Workshop 1: Session Summaries 
 
 
Session I: Contextualising the CBM mechanism 
 
• When the CBM mechanism was developed for the BWC, how was it 
conceived to fit within the broader context of compliance 
assessment and verification? 
• What were the main considerations affecting the negotiations of the 
CBM modalities? 
 
Presentation by Nicholas Sims 
 
The workshop series kicked off with a presentation by Nicholas Sims outlining 
the historical context within which the CBM mechanism was first agreed. Sims 
began his presentation by emphasizing that CBMs developed out of a crisis of 
confidence resulting from: (1) unresolved allegations of non-compliance in the 
Cold War context, (2) rapid developments in science and technology, 
particularly advances in recombinant DNA technology, and (3) other 
pressures in the early 1980s, including poor relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, during the so-called ‘second Cold War.’ 
 
Sims noted that CBMs were agreed at a time when it seemed a verification 
system was going to be put in place that resembled the declarations and on-
site inspections of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). But, while 
some BWC delegations were confident that such an agreement would be 
reached between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, other delegations did not 
share this belief, and, in the end, an agreement was never reached. Between 
1991 and 2001, verification again became a topic of intense debate, while 
CBMs were neglected, neither enhanced nor expanded, and ultimately left to 
fulfill a role for which they were not well suited. 
 
Considering the question of where CBMs were conceived to fit within the 
broader context of compliance assessment and verification, Sims described 
CBMs as adding to a multi-layered regime of compliance, with the 
contingency mechanism under Article V forming the first layer, CBMs (under 
Article V and linked to Article X) the second, while the third, verification, is still 
missing. CBMs, as they were agreed in 1986 and later expanded in 1991, 
therefore remain the uppermost layer within the regime of compliance, 
suggesting all the more reason to strengthen them. 
 
Sims then provided a detailed summary of the political context within which 
CBMs, and their modalities, were developed. In particular, Sims 
acknowledged the importance of the Stockholm Document of 19 September 
1986 in intensifying the efforts of the BWC to agree on a CBM package – one 
that emphasized the importance of openness and cooperation through the 
exchange of information necessary to “build up a picture of the normal pattern 
of activity,” reducing anxiety and building confidence. 
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Sims closed his presentation urging workshop participants to consider future 
steps that can be taken to strengthen the BWC. In particular, he pointed to the 
importance of the Accountability Framework (originally proposed by Canada), 
as a measure to run alongside CBMs, with the potential to organize collective 
scrutiny of compliance. Under this framework, he explained, it would be for 
each State Party to find a way to demonstrate compliance, which would then 
be reviewed at annual Accountability Sessions. In the absence of a 
verification system, Sims stressed, an Accountability Framework is vital, and 
should be adopted at the Seventh Review Conference. 
 
Presentation by Roger Roffey 
 
Roger Roffey’s presentation also discussed the historical context within which 
CBMs were introduced, as well as the evolution of the CBM forms and some 
ambiguities and deficiencies of the CBM mechanism. Roffey began by 
highlighting that allegations of breaches of the Convention sparked the debate 
on international verification measures in the early 1980s. He also noted that 
the Swedish UN First Committee Resolution, agreed in 1982, helped lay the 
groundwork for CBMs, calling for a special meeting between States Parties to 
“establish flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedures” to deal with 
issues concerning compliance with the BWC.  
 
During his presentation, Roffey summarized CBM Forms A-D, agreed in 1986, 
and CBM Forms A-G, agreed in 1991, raising a number of questions about 
their intended purpose and the scope of the CBM regime. First, he 
emphasized that CBMs, in the BWC context, did not achieve the verification 
standard set by the CWC. Instead, they were developed as part of a politically 
binding compliance regime. Second, he emphasized that biodefence is central 
to the BWC, and to the CBM regime, but there is some ambiguity with regard 
to what should be included in this category. In particular, Roffey pointed to the 
blurring of lines between defensive and offensive research and development, 
and military versus civilian biodefence. Finally, he drew attention to the new 
challenges posed by rapid advances in biotechnology and the growing threat 
of bioterrorism. 
 
Roffey included a number of proposals in his presentation, primarily aimed at 
improving transparency in the context of biodefence research and 
development. Drawing on a Swedish proposal made at the Third Review 
Conference, he emphasized the need for greater openness on sources of 
funding, annual budget, organizational structure and activities and equipment, 
particularly work on aerosols. Roffey closed with a call to initiate an informal 
meeting among States Parties to share information on current biodefence 
research and development activities and to find ways to improve the relevant 
CBM forms, including adding questions on codes of conduct and national 
oversight, as well as specifying the need to declare work “aimed at protection 
against the intentional use of biological agents and toxins” on CBM A, part 2. 
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Plenary discussion 
 
Workshop participants expanded on a number of key points raised in the 
preceding presentations. It was suggested that CBMs remain useful, but 
should be updated to reflect the present political and security context, as well 
as scientific and technological advances. 
 
It was acknowledged that CBMs were introduced in the Cold War context, i.e. 
at a time when the major superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United 
States – maintained a bipolar security environment. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the threat, or at least the perception of that threat, has changed. It was 
argued that in addition to state-state conflict it is necessary to consider state-
non-state conflict, particularly the threat posed by terrorism. Questions were 
raised about the suitability of CBMs in today’s context, such as: Do CBMs 
capture concerns about bioterrorism? Does the classical notion of biodefence 
address these concerns? Should there be an increased focus on biosecurity? 
How should these terms be defined? 
 
It was also argued that rapid advances in biotechnology and information 
technology have increased the ‘dual-use’ threat, which should be addressed 
in revising CBMs. Over the last twenty years, advances in biotechnology have 
expanded the “tool kit” available to the life sciences, increasing the 
possibilities for deliberate misuse. Similarly, the information technology 
revolution has enabled greater access to information and knowledge that 
could be exploited. 
 
Finally, a number of workshop participants underlined that it is important to 
recall and reinforce the purpose of CBMs. CBMs were generally understood 
as transparency measures intended to build confidence through the exchange 
of information relevant to the Convention. Thus, it is essential to identify what 
information matters most in today’s context, answering the question: What 
information builds confidence? 
 
 
• What have been the key strengths of the mechanism and what have 
been its key criticisms? 
 
Presentation by Jez Littlewood 
 
Jez Littlewood’s presentation outlined a number of strengths and weaknesses 
of the CBM mechanism, as well as highlighting some indicators, both positive 
and negative, which might suggest how the “comprehensive review” of CBMs 
will play out at the 2011 Review Conference.  
 
Littlewood outlined the following strengths of the CBM mechanism: CBMs are 
a familiar aspect of the BWC, having existed for over twenty years; much of 
the information requested on CBM forms is still relevant in the BWC context; 
CBMs are state-led, adaptable and promote openness; CBMs are synergistic, 
providing a bridge between diverse reporting structures at the national, 
international and civil society level, and, finally, CBMs can be improved at a 
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low cost with positive impacts. 
 
He then outlined the following weaknesses: CBMs were intended to be an 
interim solution, not a permanent fixture of the BWC; the CBM mechanism 
maintains an ambiguous relationship between Article V, on compliance, and 
Article X, on cooperation; CBMs are a bolted on “extra,” having not been 
integrated into accountability, compliance or implementation frameworks, and, 
finally, CBMs provide partial transparency between states and are opaque to 
the outside world. 
 
He then identified a number of positive and negative indicators that could 
influence the success of the CBM debate at the Seventh Review Conference. 
Among the positive indicators were: an interest on behalf of States Parties in 
CBMs and their further development; contributions made by civil society in 
preparation for 2011, and, finally, the fact that there is room for creativity and 
scope for improvement. 
 
Among the negative indicators were: much work is required to prepare the 
ground for 2011; CBMs will only be one topic among many; resistance to 
change, and, finally, reluctance on the part of States Parties to challenge 
spurious reasons for non-submission.  
 
Finally, he cautioned that it will be difficult to build consensus and take CBMs 
forward in 2011. There are expectations, and then there are realities. 
Decisions on CBMs are prone to political whims, can easily be rejected and 
there is a tendency towards an either/or dichotomy: either CBMs or 
verification, which might overshadow current efforts. 
  
Plenary discussion 
 
A number of general comments were made following this presentation, 
including the observation that it is difficult to change the status quo. Thus, 
improving the CBM mechanism will require strong political will, as well as 
sound proposals. CBMs were argued to have been neither a success nor a 
failure. The CBM mechanism was an interim solution that continued longer 
than expected. There was some concern that CBMs cannot live up to the 
expectations that the BWC demands of them. The question was posed: “Do 
CBMs actually build confidence?” One of the biggest weaknesses leveled at 
the CBM mechanism was that it lacks integration within the BWC framework. 
Despite these weaknesses, workshop participants expressed that there is 
scope for improvement. In particular, it was stressed that there is a clear 
opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the CBM mechanism through 
increasing participation in the annual CBM information exchange. Irrespective 
of the content of the CBM forms, participation can, and should, be universal.  
 
A number of specific comments were also made that identified weaknesses in 
the CBM mechanism and possible avenues for improvement. It was 
suggested that there is a lack of dialogue between States Parties on CBMs 
and a lack of review of CBMs. Another participant proposed that CBM 
declarations could take place every two years, as opposed to annual 
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declarations, providing more time to complete CBM submissions. A number of 
comments were also made concerning the question of non-state actors, the 
threat of bioterrorism, and the need for domestic legislation on biosecurity and 
biosafety. Finally, one participant pointed out that the existing CBMs might 
place too much emphasis on BSL4 containment facilities. While there has 
been a proliferation in the number of BSL4 facilities, lower containment levels, 
i.e. BSL3 and BSL2, are becoming increasingly important because these 
facilitates are cheaper to operate and are sometimes used to work with 
dangerous pathogens. 
 
 
• How have the political, security, scientific and technological contexts 
changed in the twenty years since the CBM mechanism was 
introduced? 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
The plenary discussion touched on a number of observations made above, 
while adding further detail to the discussion. Three developments were 
routinely mentioned as having fundamentally changed the context within 
which CBMs operate, namely: (1) rapid advances in biotechnology, (2) the 
information technology (IT) revolution and (3) the growing threat of 
bioterrorism. Together, these changes were acknowledged as having 
potentially ‘changed the rules of the game’ by extending the tools and 
knowledge of biology to a growing number of actors, including those with both 
the intent and capability to cause deliberate harm. Many, if not all, workshop 
participants agreed that these developments should be accounted for in the 
CBM mechanism. 
 
Concerning biotechnology, it was stressed that much has changed since the 
CBM mechanism was introduced. Over the last twenty years, the capability to 
manipulate molecular life has greatly increased and the necessary knowledge 
and capacity have been globally distributed. Synthetic biology was picked up 
on by several workshop participants as being indicative of this transformation. 
A science that promises to make genetic engineering easier and more widely 
accessible, synthetic biology is suggestive of a ‘new biology’ that is no longer 
confined to major research institutes, vaccine production facilities and 
biodefence research facilities, but also extended to bio-assembly facilities, 
small-scale laboratories and informal research settings.  
 
IT was similarly picked up on as having grown exponentially over the last 
twenty years, having significant implications for the diffusion of knowledge, 
both constructive and destructive. Participants described the increase in open 
source literature on the Internet and the use of online forums as providing new 
access points for the transmission of information that might be of concern to 
the BWC. At the same time, the Internet was said to offer new opportunities 
for the rapid exchange of CBM-relevant information, CBM data storage, and 
alike. Therefore, an underlying observation was: IT has introduced new 
synergies that can be viewed as both a cause of concern and an opportunity.  
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Finally, the threat of bioterrorism, partly enabled by advances in biotechnology 
and IT, was raised as pushing the scope of what is presently covered under 
CBMs, and possibly under the BWC more generally. Workshop participants 
expressed a degree of unease regarding the applicability of CBMs in a 
security context that seems less aligned with the conventional state-state 
conflicts that motivated the introduction of CBMs during the Cold War. Today, 
participants observed, there has been a broadening of the threat spectrum to 
include non-state actors, employing more unconventional means of attack, 
which might require that CBMs be updated to capture the measures taken by 
states to counter this threat. For example, States Parties might want to share 
information on steps taken to prevent bioterrorism and/or to mitigate the 
impact of an attack. 
 
 
Session II: Improving the quantity and quality of CBM submissions 
 
• What state party proposals and civil society recommendations have 
been made to date on revisions to the current CBM forms, and what 
is the value of these proposals? 
 
Presentation by Alex Hamilton 
 
Alex Hamilton’s presentation outlined a comprehensive list of proposals, 
forwarded by States Parties, experts, civil society and others, documented in 
the pre-circulated workshop report, “Compendium of Proposals to Improve the 
CBM Mechanism” (see Appendix B).  
 
To begin, he emphasized that thanks to these recommendations, dating back 
to the early 1990s, a wealth of material exists to help inform the debate on 
improving the CBM mechanism. He suggested that these recommendations 
can be grouped into two broad categories: (1) proposals that seek to 
encourage more States Parties to participate in the CBM information 
exchange, thereby increasing the quantity of CBM declarations, and (2) 
proposals that seek to improve the relevance of the CBM forms, thereby 
improving the quality of the information exchanged through the CBM 
mechanism. 
 
He then defined the following sub-categories of proposals that seek to: 
improve the questions asked on CBM forms, making them clearer and more 
relevant; improve the usability of CBM forms, making their completion more 
intuitive and user-friendly; modernize the reporting process, moving towards a 
comprehensive information management system; improve the national data 
collection process; strengthen the role of the ISU, developing an 
administrative office that has the resources and authority to further facilitate 
the implementation of the CBM mechanism; promote cooperation between 
States Parties, encouraging bilateral and multilateral dialogue that supports 
those parties struggling to meet their CBM obligations, and, finally, invite civil 
society groups to play a larger role in the CBM process, drawing on their 
energy and expertise to help improve the CBM mechanism and further the 
aims of the BWC.  
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• How can the existing CBM forms, submission process, and data 
access management be improved? 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
Workshop participants identified the lack of participation in the CBM process 
as the aspect of CBMs in greatest need of improvement. While nine countries 
were said to have consistently submitted annual CBMs, and these countries 
are among the “major players,” it was pointed out that, overall, there has been 
approximately 35% participation over twenty years. Over the last ten years, 
twenty-one countries were said to have made annual declarations, while 
eighty-one countries made at least one declaration over the same time. It was 
stressed that states desire “proportionality” and that if one submits its CBMs, it 
expects others to submit. A number of reasons were cited for why there is 
such a poor rate of return among States Parties, including: a lack of capacity; 
a lack of resources; a lack of governance; a government bureaucracy that 
does not facilitate data collection/collation; language problems; disinterest 
and/or a feeling that there is legitimately “nothing to declare” whatsoever. 
 
In view of these obstacles, many participants expressed an urgent need for 
increased assistance on the part of States Parties, civil society, and others, to 
aid those States Parties that request help in completing their CBM forms. 
Some participants went so far as to say that States Parties, and others, 
should “track down” those that have not submitted and offer their assistance, 
with or without an invitation to do so. Others, while not disagreeing that there 
are legitimate reasons for assistance, expressed that all States Parties have 
the necessary capacity to make declarations, even if it is to merely 
acknowledge that there is “nothing to declare” and there never has been 
anything to declare. It was suggested that those States Parties with more to 
declare should declare more and those with less to declare should declare 
less, but everyone should declare something. One participant also suggested 
a “lottery,” where all countries that have never submitted CBMs are put in a 
lottery and the country that is chosen is offered one-to-one assistance. 
 
Other proposals to increase the number of CBM submissions, included: ISU 
reminders alerting States Parties to the 15 April deadline; submission 
guidelines; returning a copy of the previous year’s submission (although it was 
mentioned that this might pose a liability issue for the ISU); regional 
workshops on national implementation and data collection/collation; outreach 
activities aimed at reminding States Parties of their “obligation” to submit 
complete, accurate and annual CBMs; “streamlining” the CBM forms, 
improving their formatting, adding tick boxes and multiple choice questions, 
and introducing electronic CBMs as soon as possible, which could include 
drop boxes, etc., all with the aim of making the CBM submission process 
more intuitive, easier and faster to complete. 
 
Workshop participants also stressed a concurrent need to update CBMs to 
meet today’s context and to remove ambiguities in the wording of the 
questions asked. It was suggested that this would not only help make the 
information more relevant, enhancing the quality of the information 
! 22 
exchanged, but would also have positive spin-offs for encouraging greater 
participation in the CBM process because of the perceived value-added by 
more focused questions. It was also suggested that CBMs should be made as 
open as possible to the public, helping to establish a spirit of “full compliance,” 
which might motivate further participation in the CBM process. 
 
Finally, it was discussed that CBMs could be linked to a verification system, 
but that CBMs should not be confused with a verification system. A 
verification system would require States Parties to sign on to a new protocol in 
the future, which all States Parties would not necessarily be willing to do. 
 
 
Session III: Reconsidering the current CBMs 
 
• If the measures were to be redesigned from scratch, what content 
would be covered? 
 
Feedback from Richard Lennane’s working group 
 
Speaking on behalf of his working group, Richard Lennane proposed a 
structured way of rethinking CBMs, posing the following questions: (1) “What 
information would increase confidence?” (2) “How do we go about collecting 
this information?” and (3) “What should be done with this information once it is 
collected?”  
 
In response to the first question, Lennane suggested focusing on the following 
areas: biodefence research programmes, BSL4 facilities and BSL facilities 
working with agents or equipment “of concern,” such as aerosol technology. 
He also suggested focusing on national implementation efforts, as well as 
transfers, both domestically and internationally, of listed agents and relevant 
technology, such as DNA synthesizers.  
 
In response to the second question he posed about how to collect the 
information, Lennane proposed a multi-tiered reporting mechanism based on 
annual CBM declarations, ISU data collected from open sources and ad hoc 
contributions from States Parties. Combined, these elements were described 
as having the potential to produce a useful synergy, adding depth to the 
reporting process.  
 
Third, he suggested that CBM submissions could be shared at annual 
conferences that bring together those States Parties that participate in the 
CBM process. Furthermore, this data could be statistically analyzed through 
the use of automated, electronic CBM submissions that make use of tick 
boxes. Finally, it was suggested that as much information as a possible 
should be made public, while protecting sensitive information and respecting 
the wishes of States Parties to choose for themselves.  
 
Feedback from Volker Beck’s working group 
 
Volker Beck, speaking on behalf of his working group, proposed a number of 
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modifications to the existing CBM forms. First, he suggested that Form 0 
should be clarified, specifying what is meant by “Nothing to declare/Nothing 
new to declare.” Second, he proposed that Form A, part 1 should emphasize 
the need to declare BSL4 facilities, while not discouraging States Parties from 
reporting other facilities that meet very high containment standards. Also on 
Form A, part 1, he suggested that publication lists should be requested. Third, 
he suggested that Form A, part 2 should not only ask for information on 
“military biodefence,” but also “civilian biodefence.” Fourth, he suggested that 
Form B might be redundant, but before deleting this form it is necessary to 
engage the World Health Organization (WHO) to see how they understand 
and report “rare laboratory accidents.” Fifth, Form C was thought to be out of 
date, as information on publications can now be accessed through open 
sources. Sixth, Form D was identified as particularly important due to linkages 
with Article X, on cooperation, and thus should be kept. Finally, he questioned 
the relevance of Form G in today’s context, as states are less concerned with 
vaccine production capabilities. 
 
Feedback from Lorna Miller’s working group 
 
Speaking on behalf of her working group, Lorna Miller emphasized that it can 
be useful to think of CBMs “from scratch,” posing the questions: “What is the 
point of CBMs?” and “What sort of information is of interest?” She then 
explained that her group viewed CBMs as a “transparency mechanism” and 
underlined the importance of “information exchange.” She then identified 
Form E, on legislation, and Form A, part 1, on research facilities, as being 
particularly conducive to achieving these aims. Regarding Form E, she 
suggested that questions on governance and legislation are essential, as well 
as questions on oversight and awareness raising. Regarding Form A, part 1, 
she pointed out that the focus should not only be on BSL4 facilities, but also 
other production facilities. Her group had also expressed an interest in 
information on industry and the possibility of annual presentations being made 
on facilities.  
 
Miller then shifted her attention to the question of sharing information, 
questioning the various trade-offs between “private/public” declarations. She 
explained that her group found it useful to pose the question: “Who needs the 
information and why?” She then addressed the question of participation, 
considering possible roles for incentives and disincentives. Specifically, she 
forwarded the possibility of only permitting those States Parties participating in 
the CBM process to attend meetings on data collected through the CBM 
mechanism. Finally, she raised the possibility of introducing some form of 
“outsourcing mechanism,” which might be used to provide an external source 
of review and oversight.  
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Session IV: Other elements of compliance assessment 
 
• What other compliance assessment mechanisms are at our disposal 
and how does the CBM mechanism fit with these? 
 
 
Presentation by Angela Woodward 
 
Angela Woodward’s presentation outlined three BWC compliance 
mechanisms: (1) Article V, (2) Article VI and (3) UN investigations. 
 
First, she discussed Article V – consultation and cooperation procedure – 
emphasizing that this mechanism is intended for States Parties to “undertake 
to consult one another and to cooperate” through the BWC, as well as through 
“appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United 
Nations.” She cited the dialogue on the 1979 Sverdlovsk incident as an 
example of bilateral consultation and cooperation within the BWC context and 
the 1997 Thrips palmi case, a Formal Consultative Meeting, as an example of 
multilateral consultation and cooperation. She cautioned though that this 
mechanism does not offer a specific protocol.  
 
Second, she discussed Article VI – complaint procedure – emphasizing that 
this mechanism permits States Parties to lodge a complaint with the UN 
Security Council in the event that any other State Party is “acting in breach of 
its obligations.” Such a complaint, she added, should include “all possible 
evidence confirming its validity.” She also noted that States Parties are 
expected to participate in any investigation initiated by the Security Council, 
and that the Security Council is to inform States Parties of the results of the 
investigation. This mechanism was said to leave the option open for 
enforcement, but it is highly politicized and has never been used. 
 
Third, she discussed the possibility of UN investigations, including “UN 
Secretary-General fact-finding missions” and “UN Security Council mandated 
inspections.” She expressed that fact-finding missions are challenged by 
States Parties not being obliged to participate in such missions, as well as by 
the time delay in getting a fact-finding team on the ground. She added that the 
Security Council’s mandate to investigate was used in the Iraq case. 
 
Woodward concluded by drawing a distinction between the compliance 
mechanisms outlined above and the CBM mechanism, pointing out that 
compliance mechanisms are permanent, whereas CBMs were intended to be 
a temporary measure. She suggested that the existing compliance 
mechanisms should be improved “along side” CBMs. 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
Woodward’s closing point – that CBMs occupy an unstable space relative to 
the other compliance mechanisms – was reemphasized. It was also 
suggested that ensuring compliance is difficult, if not impossible, in the 
absence of on-site verification. Moreover, a number of workshop participants 
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emphasized that CBMs are not, and never were, intended to address the 
issue of compliance. These participants expressed that CBMs are 
“transparency measures” only. Others argued that, while CBMs may not 
“ensure” compliance, they do “contribute to” compliance. One participant 
explained that their country closely reviews CBM submissions to help gauge 
the activities of States Parties and consults these parties, under Article V, to 
resolve any questions or concerns. 
 
 
• How can civil society play a constructive role in increasing 
transparency and building confidence between states parties? 
 
Presentation by Iris Hunger 
 
Iris Hunger’s presentation highlighted a number of constructive roles civil 
society can play in contributing to the CBM process. To begin, she broadly 
defined civil society as “non-state actors.” She identified “knowledge, 
experience and expertise” and the ability to exert “public pressure” among the 
core competencies of civil society, which she suggested could be used to: 
offer advice to governments, pressure governments, support governments in 
implementing their decisions, or fill in the gaps where governments are 
unwilling or unable to act. Civil society was also described as operating at 
multiple levels, internationally to locally, and having the ability to be 
cooperative, supportive or confrontational.  
 
Hunger explained that civil society can contribute to enhancing transparency 
in several ways, including through monitoring States Parties’ biodefence 
activities, collecting data from open sources, analyzing and processing data to 
generate accessible information, and, ultimately, by bringing this information 
into the public sphere. By enhancing transparency in this way, she suggested, 
civil society can contribute to building confidence between governments and 
publics. Although a positive outcome, she emphasized that trying to open up 
CBMs to public scrutiny in this fashion can be constrained by limited access to 
States Parties’ information. 
 
Hunger closed her presentation with several examples of how civil society has 
contributed to enhancing transparency and building confidence in the CBM 
context. These examples included: investigating the Sverdlovsk anthrax 
outbreak (HSP), investigating past biological weapons programmes (ISSA), 
and analyzing and supporting national implementation (VERTIC). 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
The plenary discussion reinforced that there is an important role for civil 
society to play in improving the CBM mechanism. It was discussed that civil 
society can assist States Parties throughout all stages of the reporting 
process, from implementation through to data collection and analysis. It was 
suggested that civil society could play a particularly valuable role in assisting 
States Parties complete their first CBMs, as the first CBM submission is often 
the most difficult due to a lack of experience.  
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Session V: Moving forward 
 
• What role could/should the CBM discussion play at the 2011 Review 
Conference? 
• How can we collectively facilitate a constructive CBM discussion and 
revision process? 
• What needs to be prepared for the 2011 CBM discussion? 
• What are possible outcomes of the 2011 Review Conference with 
regard to CBMs? 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
Workshop participants emphasized that it is important to make CBMs a 
priority at the 2011 Review Conference to ensure that they receive the 
“comprehensive review” agreed in 2006. To achieve this, it was proposed that 
participants review the statements made at the Sixth Review Conference and 
build on States Parties’ expectations. 
 
A number of suggestions were then made for how to prepare a proposal that 
would be received favourably in 2011. Most, if not all, participants shared the 
view that it is best to build on points of agreement and to move outward, 
taking on, as closely as possible, the perspectives of States Parties. Some 
participants proposed preparing a draft proposal that could be shared with 
States Parties in advance the Seventh Review Conference. 
 
A number of participants emphasized the importance of developing a proposal 
that prioritized the need to increase participation in the CBM process. Some 
shared the view that the best way to accomplish this would be to improve the 
contents of the CBM forms, while others suggested an approach that would 
also take into consideration improvements to the reporting process, national 
data collection, administrative improvements, etc.  
 
Some participants suggested preparing a complete proposal to be agreed at 
the Seventh Review Conference and others suggested preparing a 
comprehensive, but not complete, proposal that could be reviewed at the 
Conference, but finalized at an Ad Hoc meeting following the Conference. 
 
An “incremental approach” was generally favoured as the best way forward. 
One participant highlighted two extreme options: (1) “abolish CBMs” or (2) 
“make them legally binding.” The participant then forwarded a third option: (3) 
“somewhere between option 1 and 2.” 
 
 
Summary, next steps and close 
 
The conclusion to the first workshop drew out a number of key themes 
discussed by workshop participants, including the apparent need to make 
procedural changes to the CBM mechanism, as well as improvements to the 
content of the existing CBM forms, in an effort to facilitate the increased 
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quantity and the improved quality of the information exchanged. At the same 
time, it was stressed that CBMs should be “modified,” not “revolutionized.”  
 
Proposed procedural changes to the CBM mechanism, included: modernizing 
the reporting process, providing guidelines on how to prepare CBM 
submissions, and offering further assistance to those States Parties struggling 
to fulfill their CBM obligations.   
 
Proposed modifications to the content of the CBM forms, included:  clarifying 
the titles and questions on the CBM forms, ensuring that the information 
requested is still relevant in today’s context, and streamlining the format of the 
CBM forms through the expanded use of multiple-choice questions, tick 
boxes, etc.  
 
In closing, it was stressed that it is essential to ask: “What do we want out of 
CBMs?” and to make the necessary improvements to ensure that these 
expectations are reached. The role of CBMs as “transparency measures” with 
the potential to “build confidence” through the “exchange of information” was 
identified as paramount in this regard and, thus, ensuring greater participation 
in the CBM process, as well requesting the information of greatest relevance 
to the Convention, was said to be called for.   
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Workshop 2: Substantive Agenda 
 
 
The second workshop took place immediately following the Meeting of States 
Parties on the 12th of December 2009 at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The workshop was sponsored by Norway. 
 
 
Session I: What is the purpose of a CBM mechanism? 
Chair: Reto Wollenmann 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• What should be the purpose of a CBM mechanism? 
• What (if any) revisions to the current system would best serve such a 
purpose? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by brief presentation by Marius Grinius 
and Mohammad Taghi Hosseini. 
 
 
Session II: Operational challenges 
Chair: Filippa Lentzos 
 
Plenary discussion: 
• What are operational strengths and challenges in national data 
collection and submission? 
• How can participation in the CBM mechanism be enhanced? 
• What assistance/support could be provided by civil society and 
international institutions? 
The plenary discussion was preceded by brief presentations from Amer Ikram, 
Nina Steenhard and Iris Hunger. 
 
 
Session III: What CBM system for the future? 
Chair: Richard Lennane 
 
Working Group discussions: 
• If the CBM mechanism had to be re-designed from scratch, what would 
it be like? 
The Working Group discussions were preceded by brief presentations from 
Ben Steyn, Robert Matthews and Marie Chevrier, who also chaired the 
Working Groups. 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
 
Summary, next steps and close 
Chair: Theresa Hitchens 
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Workshop 2: Session Summaries 
 
 
Session I: What is the purpose of a CBM mechanism? 
 
• What should be the purpose of a CBM mechanism? 
• What (if any) revisions to the current system would best serve such a 
purpose? 
 
Presentation by Marius Grinius 
 
Marius Grinius, Chairman of the 2009 BWC meetings, opened the second 
workshop challenging participants to think critically about the purpose of the 
BWC and the role of CBMs in the BWC context. He suggested that “times 
have changed” and that “old categories may no longer apply,” posing the 
questions: Should the category ‘WMD’ apply to ‘biological weapons’? Is the 
name ‘biological weapons’ appropriate? Are they ‘strategic weapons’? What is 
the role of ‘biology’ in modern warfare? 
 
He emphasized that CBMs could be “streamlined” and “modernized” or that 
they could be discarded, reassessed and developed from scratch. He asked: 
“How do we establish compliance?” And questioned how this might be 
achieved, and how CBMs might fit within such a framework. Finally, he 
suggested that participants use the occasion of the CBM workshop series to 
take stock of these issues and to think creatively about how CBMs could be 
developed to maximize their utility.  
 
Presentation by Mohammad Taghi Hosseini 
 
Mohammad Taghi Hosseini’s presentation drew attention to the observation 
that low participation in the CBM information exchange does not establish 
confidence and, thus, universality is needed in the absence of legally binding 
measures. 
 
He then emphasized that CBMs are an “evolving process” and that it is 
necessary to evaluate all aspects of the CBM mechanism and to make the 
necessary adjustments to enhance its utility. 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
The plenary discussion brought out a number of views on the purpose of 
CBMs and how CBMs might be improved to better serve this purpose. It was 
acknowledged that CBMs serve as a “means of communication,” facilitating 
the “exchange of information” relevant to the Convention. This exchange, in 
turn, was described as an “opportunity” for States Parties to openly share 
information on the peaceful application of biology. One participant pointed to 
two distinct functions of CBMs: (1) CBMs demonstrate a commitment on 
behalf of States Parties to the BWC, and (2) CBMs help to establish 
transparency and, through transparency, confidence, as long as the 
information exchanged is sufficient to establish transparency. Several 
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participants expressed that CBMs serve different purposes for different states, 
requiring insight into the role CBMs play for different states. Others underlined 
the importance of CBMs as a means of enhancing compliance with the 
Convention. One participant noted that CBMs can also provide a glimpse of 
how states use relevant technology. The value of CBMs was challenged in 
light of being an interim solution introduced during a time of Cold War conflict 
between East and West. However, it was also suggested that there remain 
concerns of secrecy and non-compliance that underline CBMs continued 
relevance within the BWC context. 
 
A number of views on how to go about improving the CBM mechanism were 
also shared. Some participants suggested that it is necessary to rethink the 
whole CBM mechanism and to consider alternative means of capturing the 
information that is most likely to build confidence. Others suggested a more 
incremental approach that favoured modifications to the existing CBM 
mechanism. These individuals argued for “evolution” over “revolution” and 
suggested that it would be a mistake to discard CBMs, as a suitable 
replacement may not be found.  
 
The proposed areas for improvement to the current CBM mechanism, 
included: adjusting CBMs to be more in line with the shift in perception from 
state to non-state biological weapons threats; focusing more on “risky 
bioscience,” biosafety and biosecurity; introducing a “cycle of engagement,” 
which offers feedback in response to States Parties’ declarations; making 
CBMs of greater interest to States Parties, especially developing countries 
with small biotechnology sectors and/or non-existent biodefence programmes, 
which might not otherwise see the value of CBMs; focusing CBMs on the 
exchange of information that is most likely to build confidence, including 
information on biodefence research and development activities, BSL4 
laboratories and national implementation; ensuring that no States Parties are 
deterred from making CBM submissions; introducing incentives to motivate 
increased participation in the CBM process, including the provision of annual 
follow-up sessions that offer analysis and feedback on CBM submissions to 
participating States Parties, and, finally, making it clear to all States Parties 
that CBMs should not be viewed as “voluntary,” but as an “obligation” under 
the Convention. 
 
 
Session II: Operational challenges 
 
• What are operational strengths and challenges in national data 
collection and submission? 
• How can participation in the CBM mechanism be enhanced? 
• What assistance/support could be provided by civil society and 
international institutions? 
 
Presentation by Amer Ikram 
 
Amer Ikram’s presentation outlined a number of strengths and weaknesses in 
the CBM regime, drawing on some operational challenges encountered in 
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Pakistan, as well as presenting some possible solutions to these challenges. 
 
To begin, he explained that, ideally, CBM declarations should be precise, 
thorough, timely and consistent. In practice, however, he suggested that 
States Parties encounter a number of obstacles that stand in the way of 
achieving this ideal, including: a lack of experience preparing CBMs; a lack of 
familiarity with CBMs; an unknown fear of submitting; and a lack of interest in 
submitting. 
 
He then outlined several, ideal, strengths of CBMs, including: CBMs could 
provide an alternative to verification; they are multilateral and, therefore, 
cooperative; they stand to increase transparency; and they build confidence 
between States Parties. He also outlined several practical weaknesses, 
including: CBMs are not universal; CBM submissions are inconsistent; 
reluctance or ignorance on behalf of States Parties; and financial constraints. 
 
A number of impediments to the CBM submission process encountered in 
Pakistan were provided as a case study, including: a lack of awareness; poor 
access to information from government institutions and agencies; the absence 
of a “biosecurity hub;” and limited resources. Possible solutions to these 
impediments, included, he suggested, regional and/or UN-appointed 
assistance, targeted help with collation, and assistance from civil society. 
 
In conclusion, Ikram called for workshop participants to consider the value of 
CBMs versus the implementation of Article X, as well as the possibility of 
CBMs becoming legally binding. 
 
Presentation by Nina Steenhard 
 
Nina Steenhard, drawing on her experience at the Centre for Biosecurity and 
Biopreparedness, discussed the CBM submission process in Denmark and 
the role a ‘biosecurity hub’ can play in facilitating this process. In the absence 
of a biosecurity hub, she suggested, CBM data collection must be delegated 
to multiple ministries and then reported back to an administrative office that 
does not necessarily understand the complexity of CBMs. In the presence of 
biosecurity hub, however, the effectiveness of the CBM submission process 
can be enhanced, as such a centre not only provides a centralized location to 
receive and process CBM data, but also possesses the necessary experience 
to interpret the complexities of the CBM requirements. Such a centre, she 
suggested, can also help raise awareness in the home country and ensure 
compliance with the CBM regime and the greater BWC. The key obstacle 
standing in the way of this potential, however, is limited authority to access 
the necessary information to complete the CBM forms. 
 
Presentation by Iris Hunger 
 
Iris Hunger’s presentation addressed how civil society can contribute to 
enhancing the CBM process. She began by highlighting that civil society can 
help from beginning to end, including: (1) collecting and preparing data, (2) 
collating CBM submissions, and (3) using CBM submissions. She 
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emphasized that her presentation would primarily address ‘(1)’ and ‘(3)’. 
 
First, she drew workshop participants’ attention to how civil society can assist 
in the data collection process, pointing out several actions, including: raising 
awareness that “there is a CBM requirement,” which can be facilitated by civil 
society sending reminders to governments; collecting relevant data, which 
largely depends on the national level of implementation; and filling out CBM 
forms, which can be further aided by the use of CBM guides, such as the 
guide recently developed by the EU. 
 
Second, she outlined several ways in which civil society can assist States 
Parties in using their CBMs, including the following actions: offering technical 
information or clarification; assisting with translation, although this is limited 
due to resource constraints and might be better facilitated by the ISU or 
States Parties that are willing to share their translations with others; analyzing 
participation data, which would likely to be different than the analysis 
performed by the ISU; and verifying data by way of comparing submitted data 
with open source data available on the Internet or by way of on-site or off-site 
verification of laboratories, although this is largely a state enterprise. 
 
In her concluding remarks, Hunger expressed that “we have come a long 
way,” acknowledging the introduction of the ISU, the move towards electronic 
submissions and the steps taken to compile participation data. She then 
emphasized that there is an important “niche” for civil society to play in 
enhancing the CBM process, but that resources and political mandate limit 
civil society’s contribution. 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
Workshop participants opened the plenary discussion acknowledging that 
there are clear differences between countries in terms of their experience 
with, and capacity for, collecting and processing CBM data. One participant 
emphasized that it is “helpful to keep an open mind” in light of this 
observation, as all countries are not equally prepared to fulfill the CBM 
reporting requirement, requiring different sensitivities in each case. One 
participant cited “regional problems,” indicating that in their region most 
countries did not submit CBMs or that they submitted incomplete CBMs. It 
was, however, emphasized that CBMs get “easier over time” and that the first 
CBM submission is the most difficult. Starting out, participants suggested that 
there are many questions facing national authorities, including where to find 
information, what information is important, who should be contacted regarding 
this information, and who should be delegated responsibility for collecting and 
cross-checking this information. 
 
In addition to the underlying challenges facing inexperienced countries, a 
number of structural challenges were also identified, including: language 
difficulties; the absence of a designated “national authority” or “contact point”; 
a lack of continuity or “institutional memory” between collators; a lack of 
incentives to submit; reluctance on behalf of government and industry to 
share information; the complexity of working with multiple government 
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agencies; the absence of a legal basis or mandate for CBM submission; and 
difficulties in interpreting the CBM forms. 
 
In response to these structural challenges, a number of proposals were made 
to help encourage further submission, including: using translation software; 
establishing a national contact point or national authority; ensuring continuity 
in collator rotation through the use of handover notes; introducing incentives 
that make CBMs “more interesting” to States Parties that might otherwise see 
little value in making a CBM declaration; raising awareness about the 
importance of CBMs among multiple national stakeholders, which could be 
facilitated by civil society and/or by States Parties on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis; appealing to civil society, as well as States Parties, to provide 
“technical assistance” and “political guidance;” delegating national data 
collection to sub-committees and experts in the field, including individuals 
from industry and academia; introducing a legal mandate that requires 
complete and accurate CBMs to be submitted on a regular and timely basis; 
clarifying ambiguities in the CBM forms, including the “nothing to 
declare”/“nothing new to declare” requirement; and automating the data 
collection process, which at least one State Party has begun to pursue. 
 
In conclusion, it was emphasized that CBMs can be difficult and time 
consuming, requiring approximately four months to complete for States 
Parties with the most to declare. For those States Parties lacking a robust 
infrastructure and clear legal mandate, the CBM process can be even more 
difficult. Thus, it was acknowledged that there is a clear need for States 
Parties to discuss these difficulties, as well as best practices, in an open 
forum, and to request the support of civil society and other international 
institutions where and when support is needed.   
 
 
Session III: What CBM system for the future? 
 
• If the CBM mechanism had to be re-designed from scratch, what 
would it be like? 
 
Presentation by Ben Steyn 
 
Ben Steyn suggested “cleaning the slate” and thinking critically and creatively 
about how CBMs should look. At the same time, he cautioned that it is 
important to be “realistic” in an effort to maintain the political will necessary to 
move the CBM debate forward. One idea he put forward to stimulate the CBM 
debate was to change the name of “Confidence-Building Measures” to 
“Transparency Measures” to more appropriately convey, what he described 
as, the intention of the mechanism. He also suggested that CBMs should not 
focus on lab containment levels, but on the “levels labs are working at,” thus 
capturing the “kinds of projects” carried out at facilities. 
 
Turning his attention to the content of the CBM forms, he suggested the 
following modifications: delete CBM B, on disease outbreaks, as this 
information is already covered by the WHO; delete CBM C, on publications, 
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as this information is available elsewhere; retain CBM E, on relevant 
legislation; reconsider the framing of Form G, on vaccine production facilities; 
add a CBM that allows States Parties to explicitly request assistance; and 
include States Parties views’ on relevant scientific advances. 
 
Concluding his presentation, he suggested a need for a “two-way information 
exchange,” which would provide States Parties with an opportunity to discuss 
and use the information contained in CBMs. 
 
Presentation by Robert Matthew 
 
Robert Matthew’s presentation focused on how to update CBMs to capture 
the information of greatest relevance to the Convention in today’s context. To 
achieve this, he suggested focusing on: (1) “experiments of concern,” 
referencing the “Fink Report” by the US National Academies of Science, (2) 
recent advances in science and technology, and (3) the current security 
environment. More specifically, he suggested focusing on the following 
priorities, including information on: experiments of concern conducted in 
biodefence research facilities, national oversight processes for these facilities, 
and codes of conduct relevant to these facilities; experiments of concern 
conducted in high containment laboratories, national oversight processes for 
these laboratories, and codes of conduct relevant to these laboratories; any 
other facilities conducting experiments of concern; legislation that covers 
training undertaken at listed facilities; national regulation; synthetic biology 
research and similar advanced bioengineering work; and outreach, education 
and codes of conduct. 
 
In conclusion, Matthew’s emphasized that he did not try to fit these proposals 
into the CBM template (CBM A, CBM B, etc.), rather he chose to highlight the 
“priority areas” that would, he suggested, largely address today’s biological 
weapons concerns, including bioterrorism. 
 
Presentation by Marie Chevrier 
 
Marie Chevrier’s presentation highlighted ways of improving CBMs to be more 
in line with today’s context. Historically, she suggested, CBMs were intended 
to address issues concerning dual-use infrastructure and capabilities in the 
Cold War context. Today, she suggested, it is less important to clarify “what 
states possess” and more important to clarify “how biology is being used” for 
peaceful purposes.  
 
To help focus CBMs on this change in context, she proposed the following 
modifications to the CBM forms: add laws and regulations that govern 
facilities listed on CBM A, part 1; add laws and regulations that demonstrate 
compliance with the BWC to CBM A, part 2, including procedures for “vetting” 
biodefence projects to demonstrate compliance with Article I; revise CBM B, 
focusing on disease outbreaks of particular relevance to the BWC; revise 
Form C to account for the availability of publications on the Internet and 
include information on the publication review process, codes of conduct and 
awareness raising; and add forms that capture relevant advances in science 
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and technology and other significant contextual changes. 
 
Feedback from Ben Steyn’s working group 
 
Speaking on behalf of his group, Ben Steyn emphasized that legislation 
relevant to each form should be included. He also noted that States Parties 
should provide an indication of governance and how legislation is analyzed. 
He then suggested that some form of “CBM review” should be introduced, 
which provides an occasion for States Parties to discuss, and provide 
feedback on, CBMs. He indicated that CBM analysis and comparisons against 
open sources might also be useful. He also pointed out that an indication of 
States Parties’ vulnerabilities might be assessed and shared. Certain types of 
research, including work on synthetic biology, should also be addressed in 
some capacity. Finally, he mentioned the possibility of “national compliance 
reports” and raised the question of whether “diseases that deviate from the 
norm,” as well as plant and animal diseases, should be addressed. 
 
Feedback from Robert Matthew’s working group 
 
Speaking on behalf of his group, Robert Matthew suggested that the name 
“Confidence Building Measures” should be replaced by a name that more 
closely conveys its purpose, such as “Information Exchange.” 
 
He then emphasized the importance of information on national legislation, 
regulation and oversight. He suggested that national legislation should 
become a prominent part of the CBM forms, pointing to specific questions 
such as: “Is this an offense under your legislation?” He emphasized that 
national oversight processes demonstrating compliance with the BWC should 
be indicated. He also proposed that broader regulatory aspects, such as 
awareness raising, education and codes of conduct, should be requested.  
 
Turning his attention to the topic of biodefence, he suggested that this 
measure might be divided into “biodefence” and “bio-preparedness.” Similarly, 
he suggested that biodefence contracts should be broken down into  
“biodefence contracts” and “bio-preparedness contracts.”  
 
In reference to high containment laboratories and facilities, he suggested that 
these should not be limited to BSL4s, but should also include BSL3s and 
possibly BSL2s, as these might be used to conduct work with dangerous 
pathogens that might be of interest to States Parties. 
 
Finally, he suggested that Form B should be deleted altogether, as it is 
redundant in light of the WHO, the OIE, etc. In reference to From G, he 
suggested that information should continue to be requested on vaccine 
production facilities, but information on other relevant biological research 
facilities should also be requested. 
 
Feedback from Marie Chevrier’s working group 
 
Marie Chevrier, reporting her group’s findings, emphasized a need to balance 
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the ease of CBM completion with the utility of each measure, ensuring that 
participation is increased, while not sacrificing important information. She 
pointed to the legislation requirement as being particularly important, 
suggesting that a CBM on legislation should be retained, as well as 
requesting relevant legislation on other forms. She also emphasized that 
“experiments of concern” should be addressed, embracing concerns about 
new technologies, like synthetic biology. She underlined that “codes of 
conduct” are worthwhile, but that they depend on the “context of the 
research,” so this information should also be requested. Turning her attention 
to CBM B, she suggested that “disease outbreaks and pathogens of concern” 
should be clarified. She also proposed that States Parties could calculate 
some form of “vulnerability calculus.” She then emphasized that BSL4 
facilities, in the biodefence context, should be declared. Finally, she 
encouraged some form of follow-up to CBM submissions, providing States 
Parties with an opportunity to make use of CBM data and provide feedback 
where necessary.  
 
Summary, next steps and close 
 
The second workshop closed with a brief overview of the key themes raised 
by workshop participants, including the following: CBMs are predominately 
concerned with “information exchange,” “transparency” and “communication;” 
the success of the CBM regime depends on increased participation in the 
CBM process; all States Parties are not equally well placed to make CBM 
submissions, which requires “technical” as well as “political” assistance; and 
CBMs should be modified to account for changes in context and to better 
capture the information of greatest relevance to the Convention. 
 
In closing, it was suggested that, if the outcome of the CBM debate is to be 
successful, States Parties will require a clear understanding of what they 
should report, outlined in a structured proposal, emphasizing how the 
suggested changes stand to enhance confidence. It was further emphasized 
that the findings of the 1540 Committee provide a strong indication of what 
does and does not work. Finally, it was acknowledged that a clear strategy is 
essential for successfully delivering a proposal to States Parties in the lead-up 
to 2011. 
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Workshop 3: Substantive Agenda 
 
 
The third and last workshop in the series took place on the 26th and 27th of 
April 2010 at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, Germany. The workshop 
was sponsored by Germany. 
 
 
Session I: Revising the forms 
 
Plenary discussion on reporting relevant biotechnological capacity and on 
revisions to CBM Form A, part 1  
Chair: Volker Beck 
 
Plenary discussion on reporting biodefence facilities and activities and on 
revisions to CBM Form A, part 2 and Form F 
Chair: Filippa Lentzos 
 
Plenary discussion on reporting relevant production capacity and on revisions 
to CBM Form G 
Chair: Iris Hunger 
 
Plenary discussion on reporting on relevant disease outbreaks and on 
revisions to CBM Form B 
Chair: Lorna Miller 
 
Plenary discussion on reporting on national implementation measures and on 
revisions to CBM Form E 
Chair: Marie Chevrier 
 
Plenary discussion on reporting on cooperation and assistance and on 
revisions to CBM Forms C and D 
Chair: Tonie Jaquez 
 
 
Session II: Updating the submission and distribution process 
 
Plenary discussion on modalities for submission, publication and analysis  
Chair: Piers Millett 
 
Plenary discussion on assembling the CBM package  
Chair: Piers Millett 
 
 
Summary, next steps and close 
Chair: Volker Beck 
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Workshop 3: Session Summaries 
 
 
Session I: Revising the forms 
 
• Plenary discussion on reporting relevant biotechnological capacity 
and on revisions to CBM Form A, part 1  
 
Plenary discussion 
 
CBM Form A, part 1, was acknowledged by workshop participants to be an 
important form aimed at capturing information on “capacity” and “how this 
capacity is used,” building up a picture of States Parties’ research activities. 
 
Most participants argued that the focus of this form should be on BSL4 
laboratories, irrespective of their status as ‘state’ or ‘non-state,’ ‘private’ or 
‘public.’ At the same time, participants expressed an interest in not 
discouraging States Parties from sharing information on other laboratories 
that work with dangerous pathogens at lower containment levels. It was 
suggested that all States Parties should be able to, and should have the 
opportunity to, communicate information on the types of pathogens they work 
with and where these pathogens are held. One participant also proposed 
requesting information on level 4 culture collections, but this was countered by 
others arguing that States Parties that maintain level 4 culture collections 
should necessarily have BSL4 capacity, which should already be declared. 
 
A number of participants suggested that this form could request information 
on specific select agents and/or specialized equipment, including, among 
other things, DNA synthesizers. The counter argument, however, was that this 
would require listing agents or equipment “of concern,” which would be 
problematic, as these lists would have to be agreed upon by States Parties 
and would become outdated over time. One participant posed the question: 
“How much modification would be required, for instance, to change anthrax 
into something else?” This participant suggested that “risk groups” could be 
indicated, as a possible alternative to lists.   
 
A number of participants suggested that this form should request that States 
Parties provide publication lists linked with listed laboratories. It was argued 
that such lists would provide a detailed description of the research activities 
conducted in these laboratories, including insights into the kinds of pathogens 
and types of equipment being used. It was suggested, however, that 
publication material is already available online. 
 
The subject of whether to include questions requesting information on 
maximum containment laboratories working with plant and animal pathogens 
was also discussed. A number of participants suggested this might be difficult 
because states use different standards for classifying plant and animal 
pathogens, as well as different containment standards, depending on whether 
the pathogen is endemic or non-endemic to a given region. Due, in part, to 
these complications, it was suggested that questions on plant or animal 
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pathogens should be limited to a footnote. Of the two, animal pathogens were 
suggested to be the higher priority.  
 
A number of participants expressed an interest in several of these proposals, 
indicating that there are multiple dimensions to determining capacity and the 
key is “synergy” in the reporting process. It was also acknowledged that there 
is a trade-off between requesting more information and increasing 
participation, which requires that careful consideration is given to any 
additional requests for information (a point which was raised throughout the 
CBM workshop series). In terms of requesting information on BSL4 capacity, 
however, one participant suggested that this would pose a limited burden, as 
there are relatively few BSL4s worldwide. 
 
 
• Plenary discussion on reporting biodefence facilities and activities 
and on revisions to CBM Form A, part 2 and Form F 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
CBM Form A, part 2, was said to be, arguably, the most important CBM, as it 
requests information on active biodefence programmes. From the outset of 
this discussion, it was noted that the number of reported biodefence 
programmes has increased significantly in recent years. 
 
Several participants suggested that this form could make use of yes/no 
questions, such as: “Does your country have a biodefence programme? 
Yes/No” It was argued that this would provide questions that all States Parties 
could reasonably answer. To ensure adequate detail, however, participants 
suggested that yes/no questions should be followed up by more detailed 
responses and/or links to relevant information.  
 
A number of participants emphasized the need to request information on both 
“military” and “civilian” biodefence programmes. It was argued that this 
wording is required to capture information on countermeasures against 
“biowarfare” and “bioterrorism.” To avoid disagreement in terminology, it was 
suggested that “hostile use” could be used in place of “warfare” and 
“terrorism,” thus referring to: “countermeasures against the hostile use of 
biological agents or toxins.” It was also suggested that the word “programme” 
might be misleading, as states may not consider their biodefence work as 
constituting a “coordinated programme.” Another participant questioned the 
relevance of “research and development,” suggesting that this term might not 
capture the full range of biodefence activities. It was suggested that footnotes 
could be added to clarify terms as needed. 
 
Participants also suggested that information on oversight activities could be 
requested on this form. While there was some disagreement about what 
constitutes ‘oversight’ and, thus, what kinds of questions would best capture a 
state’s oversight activities, information on oversight, in some form, was 
believed to be important. Questions might include: “What kinds of oversight 
procedures are in place to review biodefence activities in your country?” “Do 
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you use review boards?” “How often do they meet?” Some participants 
suggested that information on local oversight, i.e. facility-to-facility, would be 
useful. Others suggested that this would require too much detail and would be 
a burden on States Parties, suggesting that information on more general 
oversight activities could be captured in Form E.  One approach that was 
suggested would be to leave it to States Parties to communicate their 
oversight activities, as they understand them. 
 
A number of other proposals were also made, including the possibility of 
requesting information on: the organizational structure of the biodefence 
programme; personnel screening procedures; codes of conduct; indoor and 
outdoor aerosol testing; biodefence exercises; and vaccination programmes. 
Some participants argued that some of this information can be found on the 
Internet, so it is not necessary to ask for it again on this form. Others argued 
that there is no harm in repeating information, on this form or others, 
particularly when States Parties can easily provide a link to the relevant 
information. A degree of redundancy in the reporting process, they argued, is 
useful, as it provides an opportunity to crosscheck information. Thus, multiple 
compilations of public information, whether compiled by government, the ISU, 
civil society or others, was argued to be useful. 
 
CBM Form F, which requests information on previous programmes, was 
described as complimenting CBM Form A, part 2. This form was also argued 
to be important, even for those States Parties that have already declared past 
programmes, as archival material may become available that can be used to 
update this form. It was also argued that it is important to know the timing and 
extent to which programmes have been dismantled. For this reason, a 
number of participants suggested that this form should be mandatory to 
update every five years, as well as being mandatory for new States Parties. 
CBM Form F was deemed to be particularly important for those states that 
have yet to sign up to the Convention. It was argued that it is important to give 
such states the opportunity to declare in the future. It was also suggested that 
this form could be moved to Form 0, as information on past programmes 
might fit well in the context of “nothing to declare/nothing new to declare.” 
 
 
• Plenary discussion on reporting relevant production capacity and on 
revisions to CBM Form G 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
This plenary discussion brought out a number of interpretations of the primary 
purpose of Form G, as well as the scope of what can, and should, be 
reasonably requested on this form.  
 
On the one hand, some participants suggested that Form G, which requests 
information on vaccine production facilities, is primarily concerned with dual 
use production capacity. On the other hand, some participants suggested that 
this form is primarily concerned with Article X, on cooperation, and dual use 
production capacity is a secondary issue. Those who interpreted this form as 
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dedicated to dual use production capacity were cautious about viewing it as 
an extension of Article X. One participant expressed that if Form G were 
solely an extension of Article X, and thus concerned only with helping States 
Parties develop vaccine production capacity, then it would not make sense in 
the CBM context. CBMs are aimed at enhancing transparency in order to 
build confidence. 
 
Concerning the scope of Form G, questions were raised as to whether this 
form should be limited to human vaccine production facilities or extended to 
include animal and/or plant vaccine production facilities. Some animal vaccine 
production facilities were described as being sophisticated enough to produce 
biological weapons, suggesting that such facilities are relevant. Less was said 
about plant vaccine production facilities.  
 
Questions were also raised as to whether Form G should be limited to 
licensed vaccines, which would include all human vaccines but exclude some 
animal vaccines, or extended to include unlicensed vaccines. Some animal 
vaccines, including those produced “on the farm,” were deemed by some 
participants to be impractical to include. This led some to suggest that 
perhaps human vaccine production capacity should be the focus of this form, 
whereas others maintained that any facilities with sufficient dual use 
production capacity should be included. 
 
Further complications were introduced by the observation that vaccines may 
be: (1) produced and consumed domestically, (2) produced to be consumed 
aboard, or (3) produced abroad to be consumed domestically. Thus, the 
question was asked whether Form G should cover only vaccine production 
capacity within a territory or also outside that territory.  
 
While addressing these questions, participants acknowledged that the aim is 
to improve the “performance” of this form and not to overburden States 
Parties with information that will not enhance transparency.  
 
 
• Plenary discussion on reporting on relevant disease outbreaks and 
on revisions to CBM Form B 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
At the beginning of this discussion it was suggested that much of the 
information requested on CBM Form B can now be found on WHO and OIE 
websites, as well as on ProMed; much more information than was the case 
when CBMs were first introduced. Furthermore, many diseases that can be 
included under CBM B(i) are not relevant in the BWC context. Finally CBM 
B(ii) has rarely been used in the history of CBMs. However, it was also 
suggested that certain unusual disease outbreaks might not be satisfactorily 
documented by alternative sources. 
 
Drawing on these comments, workshop participants acknowledged that CBM 
Form B has a role to play in CBMs, but it should be tailored to more precisely 
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capture the information of greatest interest to the BWC. One workshop 
participant posed the question: “What elements of Form B do not duplicate 
existing information by the WHO, the OIE, etc., as well as strengthen CBMs?”  
 
Many participants expressed that CBM B(i) is largely redundant and could be 
deleted. It was argued that the WHO, the OIE and others, adequately cover 
this information. However it was also argued that CBM B(i) provides an 
opportunity for States Parties to indicate that they have sufficient capacity to 
monitor and report infectious disease outbreaks. It was suggested that, if 
CBM B(i) were to be retained, States Parties could provide links to relevant 
material on reported outbreaks. It was also suggested that CBM B(i) could be 
tailored to address biological weapons-relevant disease outbreaks, but this 
would require producing a list of biological weapons-relevant disease agents, 
which was suggested to be politically difficult. 
 
By contrast, many participants acknowledged the relevance of CBM B(ii), and 
suggested that this aspect of Form B should be fine-tuned and reinforced. 
Several participants drew attention to paragraph three of the modalities, which 
characterizes unusual disease outbreaks. Some argued that highlighting this 
point would be valuable in itself, as it draws attention to the fact that disease 
agents can be misused. Defining what is meant by disease outbreaks that 
“deviate from the normal pattern,” however, was raised as a concern, again 
due to the difficulty of producing a list of biological weapons-relevant disease 
agents or outbreaks. One suggestion was to leave this choice in the hands of 
States Parties, encouraging them to report on “what they deem to be 
particularly unusual” disease outbreaks. 
 
Whether CBM B(i) or CBM B(ii) is retained, one participant suggested that 
States Parties should perhaps be encouraged to report outbreaks only in the 
event that the same amount of information cannot already be found on WHO 
or OIE websites or possibly ProMed. 
 
 
• Plenary discussion on reporting on national implementation 
measures and on revisions to CBM Form E 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
Form E was acknowledged as playing a critical role in the CBM mechanism, 
as it provides a picture of a state’s legislative/regulative framework, helping to 
convey valuable information on compliance. However, the success of this 
form was said to depend on the precision of the questions asked. 
 
Workshop participants extensively discussed the yes/no question format of 
Form E. Many indicated that this format is useful, but not sufficient. It was 
argued that yes/no questions have the potential to guide States Parties to the 
questions of greatest interest to the BWC, but that these questions must be 
followed up by more detailed responses, including, among other things, 
information on the names of national institutions responsible for the 
legislation, the names of national contact points and links to relevant material. 
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It was also acknowledged that while yes/no questions are easier to complete, 
possibly encouraging a higher response rate, more questions are required to 
capture the desired information. Furthermore, some argued that Form E 
should aim to convey a State Party’s “culture” of compliance, which would 
require that each State Party has the opportunity to elaborate, in their own 
words, the steps taken to implement the Convention, which does not 
necessarily lend it itself to a yes/no question format.  
 
Beyond the question format, participants suggested a variety of questions 
aimed at capturing the most important information. Form E, in its present 
state, was acknowledged as having significant gaps. Therefore, in addition to 
the information already requested on this form, participants suggested the 
following: export and import regulations; legislation on biosafety and 
biosecurity (although it was suggested that these terms would likely require 
definitions to clarify what is meant by ‘biosafety’ and ‘biosecurity’, which could 
be provided in a footnote); legislation on disease surveillance; codes of 
conduct and oversight aimed at biodefence research; education and 
awareness raising activities; as well as specific questions on relevant science 
and technology. 
 
The potential for civil society to play a role in monitoring legislation and 
helping to prepare and implement legislation was also discussed. VERTIC’s 
work on biological weapons legislation, for example, was highlighted as 
providing countries with the possibility of feedback, through an in-depth 
survey on where there are gaps in their legislation and the steps that can be 
taken to fill these gaps. It was suggested that VERTIC and others possess a 
wealth of information that could be used to assist States Parties. The 
challenge, it was suggested, is raising awareness among States Parties that 
this information is available to them. 
 
The ISU was also acknowledged as providing another access point to 
compiled data that could be of use to States Parties. Reference was made, in 
particular, to the ISU compendium, which could provide a degree of useful 
overlap for States Parties looking to crosscheck information. It was 
emphasized that the ISU would be happy to develop a larger database and a 
dynamic system, given the appropriate mandate.  
 
 
• Plenary discussion on reporting on cooperation and assistance and 
on revisions to CBM Forms C and D 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
Workshop participants acknowledged the importance of listing publications, 
suggesting that is a valuable means of communicating information about 
States Parties’ activities. However, participants were divided between those 
who suggested that CBM Form C should be retained on the one hand, and 
those who suggested that CBM Form C should be deleted, and the relevant 
publications shifted to other forms, especially CBM A, but also CBM B and 
CBM D, on the other. 
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Those who suggested that CBM C should be retained, emphasized several 
points, including: while it may be useful to list relevant publications on other 
forms, it is also useful to retain CBM C, as publications convey a lot of 
information, and there is no harm in repeating this information; certain 
publications may not be as easily accessible online as some suggest, 
therefore, States Parties should make every effort to make their publications 
accessible; and CBM C not only provides information on “publications,” but 
also on “publication policy” (part 2 of the modalities), which offers useful 
information on the degree of openness. 
 
Those who suggested that CBM C should be deleted, emphasized several 
points, including: while deleting CBM C is recommended, these publications 
can, and should, be shifted to other forms, and information on publication 
policy could be shifted to CBM E; CBM C was intended for a time when 
publications were not widely available, whereas these can now be found 
online; and even if CBM C was retained, this form only provides States 
Parties with the “names” and “locations” of publications, not the full articles, 
therefore publications still need to be tracked down, and possibly purchased, 
online. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that participants acknowledged that some publications 
are more valuable than others, especially those concerning any and all 
laboratories and facilities listed under CBM A, part 1 and part 2.  
 
Workshop participants emphasized that CBM Form D is “integral” to the 
Convention (particularly under Article X), as it allows States Parties to take 
“concrete actions” to promote cooperation.  
 
Participants suggested several ways of expanding and reinforcing the 
“aspirational” aspects of CBM D, including: promote exchange visits, joint 
research projects and similar cooperative endeavours, in addition to planned 
events; promote this form as a “vehicle for assistance,” offering States Parties 
the opportunity to explicitly offer and request assistance; and prepare and 
maintain an online calendar, possibly through the ISU, that documents 
forthcoming opportunities for exchange, providing States Parties with 
adequate advance notice.  
 
Participants also underlined several weaknesses, including: CBM D currently 
“underestimates” the amount of ongoing cooperation (“assistance is taking 
place and is working”); and there is a lack of awareness and coordination 
between States Parties offering/requesting opportunities for exchange. 
 
One participant suggested that, even if CBM D is revamped to account for its 
present deficiencies, the burden of making use of such information still falls on 
the shoulders of States Parties to seek out and make use of cooperative 
opportunities and offers of assistance.    
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Session II: Updating the submission and distribution process 
 
• Plenary discussion on modalities for submission, publication and 
analysis 
 
Plenary discussion 
 
This plenary discussion covered multiple proposals for improving the CBM 
submission and distribution process, including the prospect of online 
submissions, flexible submission deadlines, informal translations, enhanced 
analysis and follow-up, and increased access to CBM content. 
 
At minimum, it was suggested, CBM forms should be made available online, 
with the option to submit electronically. Some participants were in favour of a 
more sophisticated system that could draw on “Web 2.0 user-driven content,” 
which would offer States Parties a secure portal where they could fill in forms, 
save their work, and send the CBM package to the ISU upon completion. It 
was suggested that such a system could be tailored to the security 
specifications of States Parties, allowing certain national authorities to read 
and fill in material, whereas others could only read this material, etc. It was 
also suggested that this system might take advantage of “pop-up windows” 
displaying the previous year’s answer to each question, which could then be 
updated as needed. Alternatively, one participant proposed “community 
submissions,” resembling a “wiki,” which would allow anybody to make entries 
and suggestions, which could be either restricted to one State Party or 
extended to other States Parties. (This proposal, it should be noted, was 
suggested to be “too informal” by at least one participant.) Another interesting 
proposal concerned the prospect of introducing a “national electronic reporting 
tool,” which at least one State Party was said to be developing. Overall, there 
was an expressed interest in online submissions, as such a system would 
decrease the time required to complete CBMs, possibly increasing 
participation rates. Such a system, it was suggested, would nonetheless 
require “point of contact” or “central editor” to sign off on the final submission.  
 
A flexible deadline was also proposed, which would allow States Parties to 
submit their CBMs at any time. This was described as a “dynamic system,” 
whereas the current 15 April deadline was described as a “static system.” 
Although workshop participants acknowledged that it would be useful to 
permit States Parties to update their CBMs at any time, a fixed deadline was 
still required. 
 
Informal translations were proposed as a means of providing CBMs in more 
languages, which, in turn, might help to enhance submission rates. However, 
several participants argued that translations should be “official,” and that 
official translations are expensive. 
 
A number of participants also picked up on the possibility of providing more 
opportunities for the analysis of, and discussion on, CBMs. On one level, it 
was suggested that ISU statistics, as well as the analysis conducted by civil 
society, offers a useful starting point for States Parties. On another level, it 
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was suggested that such analysis ultimately comes down to the individual 
efforts of States Parties, which can then be followed up under Article V on a 
bilateral basis. The possibility of introducing annual or biannual meetings 
during the intersessional process was also discussed. It was argued that such 
meetings would facilitate collective discussion, in a “spirit of cooperation,” 
providing States Parties with an opportunity to discuss all aspects of the CBM 
process and its effectiveness. Some participants, however, expressed some 
hesitation about group discussion, suggesting that such dialogue is 
traditionally done on a bilateral basis. 
 
Finally, a number of participants emphasized that CBMs, to the extent 
possible, should be shared with the public. It was argued that there are 
legitimate benefits to “public scrutiny,” including increasing the potential for 
CBM analysis and feedback, as well as the possibility of reinforcing 
compliance with the Convention and encouraging others to submit.  
 
 
• Plenary discussion on assembling the CBM package  
 
Plenary discussion 
 
This plenary discussion addressed ideas for “assembling the CBM package.” 
It was acknowledged that it is necessary to make CBMs more “interesting” to 
all States Parties. To achieve this, it was suggested, CBMs could be 
“reinvented” from the ground up or they could, preferably, be “revamped” in an 
effort to increase their performance. 
 
It was emphasized that the content of the CBM forms should account for 
changes in the science and technology, politics and security context, as well 
highlighting the importance of national implementation and the need for 
cooperation and assistance. The key, it was argued, is to “tighten up” the 
CBM mechanism, bringing it in line with the needs and expectations of States 
Parties, ensuring increased participation in the CBM process and the 
exchange of information of greatest relevance to the Convention. 
 
Successfully delivering the CBM package, it was argued, will require a “clear 
vision” and the broad support of States Parties and civil society. In particular, 
it was suggested, States Parties that are presently not participating in the 
CBM process need to be encouraged to get behind the proposed CBM plan, 
which may require emphasizing prospects for cooperation and assistance 
under Article X.     
 
The CBM package, it was cautioned, cannot be expected to go through 
without resistance; modifications will need to be made to accommodate 
States Parties in the lead up to 2011. One participant suggested that it is 
important to “set the bar high” and then fall back if the necessary changes 
cannot be agreed at the Review Conference. 
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Summary, next steps and close 
 
The closing comments of the third workshop outlined several options for how 
to move the CBM debate forward. It was acknowledged that it is important to 
develop a CBM package that captures the collective views of civil society, 
experts and States Parties, while bearing in mind that the CBM workshop 
series does not speak for States Parties. 
 
It was suggested that reports could be drawn up by CBM workshop 
participants, as well as other interested parties, to document the suggested 
proposals to improve the CBM mechanism and to invite broader engagement. 
It was also suggested that States Parties could prepare working papers for 
the Meeting of Experts, Meeting of States Parties, and the Prep Com, 
outlining specific proposals. It was felt that the discussion on CBMs could be 
further facilitated through “e-task force” groups, and it was also proposed that 
a meeting about the workshops should be held in the margins of the 2010 
Meeting of Experts.  
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Evolving Themes 
 
 
A number of key themes emerged over the course of the three workshops, 
including what the CBM mechanism is and what it is not; the relatively low 
level of participation; the changing political, security and scientific contexts; 
improvements to the content of the existing CBM forms; potential procedural 
changes to the CBM mechanism; and the role of civil society. 
 
 
The objective of the CBM mechanism 
 
Workshop participants considered the CBM mechanism to predominately 
serve as a means of communication, providing States Parties with an 
opportunity to openly share information on the peaceful applications of 
biology. By exchanging information in this way, transparency is enhanced and 
confidence between States Parties is built and maintained.  
 
It was emphasized that the mechanism should not be confused with a 
verification system, although it could form part of a verification system. It was 
also emphasized that the mechanism is not a compliance assessment 
mechanism in the way other BWC mechanisms are, such as the consultation 
and cooperation procedure under Article V, the complaint procedure under 
Article VI, and UN investigations. The CBM mechanism does not ensure 
compliance, but it may contribute to compliance. 
 
It was stressed that the submission of complete and accurate CBM returns on 
an annual basis is an obligation under the Convention, and should not be 
viewed as a voluntary undertaking. 
 
 
Level of participation 
 
Increasing participation in the CBM information exchange was seen as a clear 
opportunity to enhance the success of the mechanism. Indeed, it was noted 
that without increasing the quantity of CBM declarations, the mechanism 
might actually contradict its intended purpose and decrease confidence 
between States Parties. 
 
A number of proposals were made to encourage participation by more States 
Parties. Providing assistance to non-participants was seen as key, but other 
efforts were also considered important, such as: providing submission 
guidelines; sending reminders about the 15 April deadline; returning a copy of 
the previous year’s submission; regional workshops on national 
implementation and data collection and collation, and other outreach activities 
aimed at reminding States Parties of their obligation to submit complete, 
accurate and annual CBMs; streamlining the CBM forms and making the CBM 
submission process more intuitive, easier and faster to complete. 
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The political, security and scientific contexts 
 
Presentations on the historical circumstances in which the CBM mechanism 
was first agreed highlighted the contingent political, security and scientific 
contexts in which the modalities were developed. Much of the information 
requested in the CBM forms was still considered to be relevant today, but it 
was suggested that the forms could be updated to reflect the present political 
and security contexts – in which the biological weapons threat from non-state 
actors has become much more prominent – as well as to reflect scientific and 
technological advances. Updating the forms should take an evolutionary 
approach, favouring incremental modifications to the existing CBM 
mechanism, rather than a revolutionary approach, where the modalities would 
be reconfigured from scratch. 
 
 
The content of the CBM forms 
 
A number of suggestions were made on how to modify the questions asked 
on the CBM forms to make them clearer and more relevant in today’s context, 
thereby improving the quality of the information exchanged through the CBM 
mechanism. 
 
CBM A part 2, on active biodefence programmes, is arguably the most 
pertinent CBM to the BWC and was considered in detail during the workshop 
series. It was felt that the focus of the form should be on BSL4 laboratories 
and on biodefence facilities working on experiments or technologies of 
concern, such as experiments enhancing the virulence of pathogens or 
aerosol technology. At the same time, however, participants expressed an 
interest in not discouraging States Parties from sharing information on other 
laboratories that conduct experiments of concern or that work with dangerous 
pathogens at lower containment levels. It was suggested that all States 
Parties should be able to, and should have the opportunity to, communicate 
information on the types of pathogens they work with and where these 
pathogens are held. The importance of providing information on both military 
and civilian biodefence research and development activities in this form was 
also stressed, particularly in light of the last decade’s rapid expansion of 
biopreparedness and protection programmes. Finally, a new addition to this 
form that seemed to gain a great deal of traction at the workshops was a 
question on national oversight processes, training and codes of conduct for 
biodefence facilities. 
 
It was emphasised that, in today’s context, it is less important to clarify “what 
states possess” and more important to clarify “how biology is being used” for 
peaceful purposes and how this work is being overseen. Form A part 1, on 
research facilities, was identified as particularly conducive to achieving this 
aim; as was Form E, on legislation. It was felt that national implementation 
efforts, broadly understood, should form a central part of Form E. 
 
Suggestions for more detailed revisions are listed in Appendices B and C. 
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Procedural changes 
 
Hand-in-hand with the discussion on improving the content of the CBM forms 
were discussions on improving the usability of CBM forms, making their 
completion more intuitive and user-friendly, and on modernizing the reporting 
process, moving towards a comprehensive information management system. 
There were also some discussions about changing the name of “Confidence-
Building Measures” to something that more closely conveys their purpose, 
such as  “Information Exchange” or “Transparency Measures.” 
 
The workshops also considered the introduction of a “cycle of engagement,” 
which would offer feedback in response to States Parties’ declarations. This 
could take the form of annual presentations of declarations, and the idea of 
restricting these presentations to States Parties participating in the CBM 
process only was raised.  
 
Finally, in the interest of transparency, it was suggested that as much 
information as a possible should be made public, while protecting sensitive 
information and respecting the wishes of States Parties to choose for 
themselves.  
 
 
The role of civil society 
 
Opening up the CBM mechanism to the public became a theme in its own 
right during the workshops. It was highlighted that the knowledge, experience 
and expertise of civil society can contribute to the CBM communication 
process and to enhancing transparency between States Parties in several 
ways, including through: assisting States Parties to collect and collate CBM 
information; monitoring Sates Parties’ biodefence activities; collecting data 
from open sources; analyzing and processing data to generate accessible 
information; and, ultimately, by bringing this information into the public sphere. 
 
 
 
 
!
A 1 
Appendix A: Agreed Forms for the Submission of CBMs from 
the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference 
(BWC/CONF.III/23) 
 
 
At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that all States Parties present the 
following declaration: 
 
1. Declaration form on Nothing to Declare or Nothing New to Declare for use in 
the information exchange 
 
Measure   Nothing to declare  Nothing new to declare 
 
A, part 1         
 
A, part 2 (i)         
 
A, part 2 (ii)         
 
A, part 2 (iii)         
 
B (I)          
 
B (ii)          
 
C          
 
D          
 
E          
 
F          
 
G          
 
(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure, with a tick.) 
 
Date: __________________________________________________________ 
 
State Party to the Convention: ______________________________________ 
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2. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE A: 
 
Part 1:   Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories 
 
At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to 
implement the following: 
 
!Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of 
activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or 
international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, 
biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or 
specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the 
Convention." 
 
Modalities 
 
The Third Review Conference agreed that data should be provided by States 
Parties on each facility, within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control 
anywhere, which has any maximum containment laboratories meeting those criteria 
for such maximum containment laboratories as specified in the 1983 WHO 
Laboratory Biosafety Manual such as those designated as biosafety level 4 (BL4) or 
P4 or equivalent standards. 
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Form A, part 1 
 
Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories1 
 
1. Name(s) of facility2   _________________________________ 
 
2. Responsible public or private  _________________________________ 
organization or company  _________________________________ 
 
3. Location and postal address  _________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
 
4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the 
activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Number of maximum containment units3 within the research centre and/or 
laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m2) 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-
organisms and/or toxins as appropriate 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________
                                                 
1 The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with 
laboratories, should be identified separately. 
2 For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological 
defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark !Declared in 
accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)". 
3 In accordance with the 1983 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, or equivalent. 
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Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence research and 
development programmes 
 
At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties are to 
implement the following: 
 
In the interest of increasing the transparency of national research and 
development programmes on biological defence, the States Parties will declare 
whether or not they conduct such programmes.  States Parties agreed to provide, 
annually, detailed information on their biological defence research and development 
programmes including summaries of the objectives and costs of effort performed by 
contractors and in other facilities.  If no biological defence research and development 
programme is being conducted, a !null" report will be provided. 
 
States Parties will make declarations in accordance with the attached forms, 
which require the following information: 
 
(1) the objective and summary of the research and development activities under 
way indicating whether work is conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies 
on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, 
treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related 
research; 
 
(2) whether contractor or other non-defence facilities are utilized and the total 
funding provided to that portion of the programme; 
 
(3) the organizational structure of the programme and its reporting relationships; 
and 
 
(4) the following information concerning the defence and other governmental 
facilities in which the biological defence research and development programme is 
concentrated; 
 
(a) location; 
(b) the floor areas (sqM) of the facilities including that dedicated to each 
of BL2, BL3 and BL4 level laboratories; 
(c) the total number of staff employed, including those contracted full time 
for more than six months; 
(d) numbers of staff reported in (c) by the following categories: civilian, 
military, scientists, technicians, engineers, support and administrative staff; 
(e) a list of the scientific disciplines of the scientific/engineering staff; 
(f) the source and funding levels in the following three areas: research, 
development, and test and evaluation; and 
(g) the policy regarding publication and a list of publicly-available papers 
and reports. 
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Form A, part 2 (i) 
 
National biological defence research and development programme Declaration 
 
Is there a national programme to conduct biological defence research and 
development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control 
anywhere?  Activities of such a programme would include prophylaxis, studies on 
pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, 
toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research. 
 
 
Yes/No 
 
If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a 
description of the programme. 
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Form A, part 2 (ii) 
 
National biological defence research and development programme 
 
Description 
 
1. State the objectives and funding of the programme and summarize the 
principal research and development activities conducted in the programme.  Areas to 
be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, 
diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical 
protection, decontamination and other related research. 
 
2. State the total funding for the programme and its source. 
 
3. Are aspects of this programme conducted under contract with industry, 
academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities? 
 
Yes/No 
 
4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for the programme is expended in 
these contracted or other facilities? 
 
5. Summarize the objectives and research areas of the programme performed by 
contractors and in other facilities with the funds identified under paragraph 4. 
 
6. Provide a diagram of the organizational structure of the programme and the 
reporting relationships (include individual facilities participating in the programme). 
 
7. Provide a declaration in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii) for each facility, 
both governmental and non-governmental, which has a substantial proportion of its 
resources devoted to the national biological defence research and development 
programme, within the territory of the reporting State, or under its jurisdiction or 
control anywhere. 
 
A  7 
Form A, part 2 (iii) 
 
National biological defence research and development programme 
 
Facilities 
 
Complete a form for each facility declared in accordance with paragraph 7 in 
Form A, part 2 (ii). 
 
In shared facilities, provide the following information for the biological 
defence research and development portion only. 
 
1. What is the name of the facility? 
 
2. Where is it located (include both address and geographical location)? 
 
3. Floor area of laboratory areas by containment level: 
BL2 __________________________ (sqM) 
BL3 __________________________ (sqM) 
BL4 __________________________ (sqM) 
Total laboratory floor area ____________________________ (sqM) 
 
4. The organizational structure of each facility. 
(I) Total number of personnel   _____________________ 
 
(ii) Division of personnel: 
Military     _____________________ 
Civilian     _____________________ 
 
(iii) Division of personnel by category: 
Scientists     _____________________ 
Engineers     _____________________ 
Technicians     _____________________ 
Administration and support staff  _____________________ 
 
(iv) List the scientific disciplines 
represented in the scientific/ 
engineering staff. 
 
 (v) Are contractor staff working in 
the facility?  If so, provide an 
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approximate number. 
 
(vi) What is (are) the source(s) of 
funding for the work conducted 
in the facility, including 
indication if activity is 
wholly or partly financed by 
the Ministry of Defence? 
 
(vii) What are the funding levels 
for the following programme 
areas: 
 
Research     _____________________ 
Development     _____________________ 
Test and evaluation    _____________________ 
 
(viii) Briefly describe the publication 
policy of the facility: 
 
(ix) Provide a list of publicly-available 
papers and reports resulting 
from the work during the 
previous 12 months.  (To include 
authors, titles and full  
references.) 
 
5. Briefly describe the biological defence work carried out at the facility, 
including type(s) of micro-organisms4 and/or toxins studied, as well as 
outdoor studies of biological aerosols. 
                                                 
4 Including viruses and prions. 
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3. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE B: 
 
Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins 
 
At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States Parties continue to 
implement the following: 
 
Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins, and on all such events that seem to deviate from the 
normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence.  The 
information provided on events that deviate from the norm will include, as soon as it 
is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of 
cases. 
 
Modalities 
 
The Third Review Conference agreed the following definition: 
 
An outbreak or epidemic is the occurrence of an unusually large or unexpected 
number of cases of an illness or health-related event in a given place at a given time.  
The number of cases considered as unusual will vary according to the illness or event 
and the community concerned. 
 
Furthermore, reference was made to the following definitions: 
 
An epidemic of infectious disease is defined as the occurrence of an unusually 
large or unexpected number of cases of a disease known or suspected to be of 
infectious origin, for a given place and time.  It is usually a rapidly evolving situation, 
requiring a rapid response (WHO internal document CDS/Mtg/82.1). 
 
The occurrence in a community or region of cases of an illness, specific 
health-related behaviour, or other health-related events clearly in excess of normal 
expectancy.  The community or region, and the time period in which the cases occur, 
are specified precisely.  The number of cases indicating the presence of an epidemic 
will vary according to the agent, size and type of population exposed, previous 
experience or lack of exposure to the disease, and time and place of occurrence: 
epidemicity is thus relative to usual frequency of the disease in the same area, among 
the specified population, at the same season of the year.  A single case of a 
communicable disease long absent from a population or first invasion by a disease not 
previously recognized in that area requires immediate reporting and full field 
investigation: two cases of such a disease associated in time and place may be 
sufficient evidence to be considered an epidemic. (J.M. Last, A Dictionary of 
Epidemiology, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, Toronto, 1983.) 
 
The Third Review Conference agreed on the following: 
 
1. In determining what constitutes an outbreak States Parties are recommended to 
take guidance from the above. 
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2. Since no universal standards exist for what might constitute a deviation from 
the normal pattern, States Parties agreed to utilize fully existing national reporting 
systems on human diseases as well as animal and plant diseases, where possible, and 
systems within the WHO to provide annual update of background information on 
diseases caused by organisms which meet the criteria for risk groups II, III and IV 
according to the classification in the 1983 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, the 
occurrence of which, in their respective areas, does not necessarily constitute a 
deviation from normal patterns.5 
 
3. Exchange of data on outbreaks that seem to deviate from the normal pattern is 
considered particularly important in the following cases: 
 
- when the cause of the outbreak cannot be readily determined or the 
causative agent6 is difficult to diagnose, 
 
- when the disease may be caused by organisms which meet the criteria 
for risk groups III or IV, according to the classification in the 1983 
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 
 
- when the causative agent is exotic to a given region, 
 
- when the disease follows an unusual pattern of development, 
 
- when the disease occurs in the vicinity of research centres and 
laboratories subject to exchange of data under item A, 
 
- when suspicions arise of the possible occurrence of a new disease. 
 
4. In order to enhance confidence, an initial report of an outbreak of an infectious 
disease or a similar occurrence that deviate from the normal pattern should be given 
promptly after cognizance of the outbreak and should be followed up by annual 
reports. 
 
To enable States Parties to follow a standardized procedure, the Conference 
has agreed that Form B (ii) should be used, to the extent information is known and/or 
applicable, for the exchange of initial as well as annual information. 
 
5. In order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities and in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence 
of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, States Parties are encouraged to invite experts 
from other States Parties to assist in the handling of an outbreak, and to respond 
favourably to such invitations. 
                                                 
5 This information should be provided in accordance with Form B (I). 
6 It is understood that this may include organisms made pathogenic by molecular 
biology techniques, such as genetic engineering. 
A  11 
Form B (I) 
 
Background information on outbreaks of reportable 
infectious diseases 
 
 
 
 
Number of cases per year 
 
 
Disease  
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
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Form B (ii) 
 
Information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to 
deviate from the normal pattern 
 
1. Time of cognizance of the outbreak   .......................................... 
 
2. Location and approximate area affected  .......................................... 
 
3. Type of disease/intoxication    .......................................... 
 
4. Suspected source of disease/ 
intoxication      .......................................... 
 
5. Possible causative agent(s)    .......................................... 
 
6. Main characteristics of systems   .......................................... 
 
7. Detailed symptoms, when applicable   .......................................... 
 
- respiratory     .......................................... 
- circulatory     .......................................... 
- neurological/behavioural   .......................................... 
- intestinal     .......................................... 
- dermatological    .......................................... 
- nephrological     .......................................... 
- other      .......................................... 
 
8. Deviation(s) from the normal pattern as regards 
 
- type      .......................................... 
- development     .......................................... 
- place of occurrence    .......................................... 
- time of occurrence    .......................................... 
- symptoms     .......................................... 
- virulence pattern    .......................................... 
- drug resistance pattern   .......................................... 
- agent(s) difficult to diagnose   .......................................... 
- presence of unusual vectors   .......................................... 
- other      .......................................... 
 
9. Approximate number of primary cases  .......................................... 
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10. Approximate number of total cases   .......................................... 
 
11. Number of deaths     .......................................... 
 
12. Development of the outbreak    .......................................... 
 
13. Measures taken     .......................................... 
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4. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE C: 
 
- Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of 
knowledge 
 
At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States parties continue to 
implement the following: 
 
!Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly 
related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States 
parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge 
gained in this research." 
 
Modalities 
 
The Third Review Conference agreed on the following: 
 
1. It is recommended that basic research in biosciences, and particularly that 
directly related to the Convention should generally be unclassified and that 
applied research to the extent possible, without infringing on national and 
commercial interests, should also be unclassified. 
 
2. States parties are encouraged to provide information on their policy as regards 
publication of results of biological research, indicating, inter alia, their 
policies as regards publication of results of research carried out in research 
centres and laboratories subject to exchange of information under item A and 
publication of research on outbreaks of diseases covered by item B, and to 
provide information on relevant scientific journals and other relevant scientific 
publications generally available to States parties. 
 
3. The Third Review Conference discussed the question of cooperation and 
assistance as regards the safe handling of biological material covered by the 
Convention.  It concluded that other international forums were engaged in this 
field and expressed its support for efforts aimed at enhancing such 
cooperation. 
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5. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE D: 
 
- Active promotion of contacts 
 
At the Third Review Conference it was agreed that States parties continue to 
implement the following: 
 
!Active promotion of contacts between scientists, other experts and facilities 
engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including 
exchanges and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis." 
 
Modalities 
 
The Third Review Conference agreed on the following: 
 
In order to actively promote professional contacts between scientists, joint 
research projects and other activities aimed at preventing or reducing the occurrence 
of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and at improving international cooperation in 
the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, States parties are 
encouraged to provide information, to the extent possible: 
 
- on planned international conferences, seminars, symposia and similar 
events dealing with biological research directly related to the 
Convention, 
 
- on other opportunities for exchange of scientists, joint research or other 
measures to promote contacts between scientists engaged in biological 
research directly related to the Convention. 
 
To enable States parties to follow a standardized procedure, the Third Review 
Conference has agreed that Form D should be used for exchange of information under 
this item. 
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Form D 
 
Active promotion of contacts 
 
1. Planned international conferences, symposia, seminars, and other similar 
forums for exchange 
 
For each such event, the following information should be provided: 
 
- name of the conference, etc.   .......................................... 
 
- arranging organization(s), etc.  .......................................... 
 
- time      .......................................... 
 
- place      .......................................... 
 
- main subject(s) for the conference, etc. .......................................... 
 
.......................................... 
 
- conditions for participation   .......................................... 
 
.......................................... 
 
- point of contact for further  
information, registration, etc.   .......................................... 
 
.......................................... 
 
.......................................... 
 
2. Information regarding other opportunities 
 
.............................................................................................................................. 
 
.............................................................................................................................. 
 
.............................................................................................................................. 
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6. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE E: 
 
- Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures 
 
At the Third Review Conference the States parties agreed to implement the 
following: 
 
As an indication of the measures which they have taken to implement the Convention, 
States parties shall declare whether they have legislation, regulations or other 
measures: 
 
(a) to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery, specified in Article I of the Convention, 
within their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control; 
 
(b) in relation to the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to 
man, animals and plants or of toxins in accordance with the Convention; 
 
States parties shall complete the attached form (Form E) and shall be prepared to 
submit copies of the legislation or regulations, or written details of other measures on 
request to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs or to an individual 
State party.  On an annual basis States parties shall indicate, also on the attached form, 
whether or not there has been any amendment to their legislation, regulations or other 
measures. 
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Form E 
 
Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures 
 
Relating to    Legislation Regulations Other 
 Amended         
 measures since last       
    year 
 
(a) Development, production 
stockpiling, acquisition 
or retention of microbial 
or other biological agents, 
or toxins, weapons, equip- 
ment and means of delivery 
specified in Article I    Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
 Yes/No 
 
(b) Exports of micro-organisms7   Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
 Yes/No 
and toxins 
 
(c) Imports of micro-organisms7  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
 Yes/No 
and toxins 
 
                                                 
7 Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the 
Convention. 
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7. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE F: 
 
- Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes 
 
In the interest of increasing transparency and openness, States parties shall 
declare whether or not they conducted any offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes since 1 January 1946. 
 
If so, States parties shall provide information on such programmes, in 
accordance with Form F. 
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Form F 
 
Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and 
development programmes 
 
1. Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State party. 
 
2. Past offensive biological research and development programmes: 
 
- Yes - No 
 
- Period(s) of activities 
 
- Summary of the research and development activities indicating 
whether work was performed concerning production, test and 
evaluation, weaponization, stockpiling of biological agents, the 
destruction programme of such agents and weapons, and other related 
research. 
 
3. Past defensive biological research and development programmes: 
 
- Yes - No 
 
- Period(s) of activities 
 
- Summary of the research and development activities indicating 
whether or not work was conducted in the following areas: 
prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic 
techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical 
protection, decontamination, and other related research, with location 
if possible. 
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8. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE G: 
 
- Declaration of vaccine production facilities 
 
To further increase the transparency of biological research and development related to 
the Convention and to broaden scientific and technical knowledge as agreed in Article 
X, each State party will declare all facilities, both governmental and non-
governmental, within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, 
producing vaccines licensed by the State party for the protection of humans.  
Information shall be provided on Form G attached. 
A  22 
Form G 
 
Declaration of vaccine production facilities 
 
1. Name of facility: 
 
2. Location (mailing address): 
 
3. General description of the types of diseases covered 
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Key findings 
 
 
 
 
Since the current Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were introduced in 
1991, a number of proposals have been made to improve the CBM 
mechanism. These proposals seek to:  
 
1. Review the questions asked on the CBM forms, ensuring that they are 
clear, relevant and contribute to enhancing transparency and building trust 
between States Parties;  
 
2. Improve the format of the CBM forms, making their completion more 
intuitive and user-friendly, while also addressing the need to make CBMs 
available in a wider number of languages, ensuring universal accessibility;  
 
3. Modernise the reporting process, making greater use of electronic CBM 
forms and online resources, moving towards a comprehensive web-based 
information management system that is accessible to all States Parties;  
 
4. Improve national data collection processes, encouraging improved collator 
rotation through handover notes, and offering guidelines, completed CBM 
forms, data collection and collation workshops and one-to-one assistance;   
 
5. Strengthen the role of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), moving 
towards an administrative office that will have the appropriate authority 
and the resources to facilitate the implementation of the CBM mechanism;  
 
6. Promote cooperation between States Parties, encouraging bilateral and 
multilateral dialogue, allowing States Parties, which are in a position to do 
so, to assist other States Parties struggling to fulfill their CBM obligations;  
 
7. Invite civil society groups and international organisations to play a role in 
the CBM information exchange, drawing on their expertise and energy to 
help address problems with the CBM mechanism and seek possible 
solutions.  
 
In the lead-up to the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, it is hoped that this 
compendium of proposals to date will help States Parties and experts engage 
in meaningful and productive debate concerning the future of the CBMs. 
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Proposals to improve the CBM mechanism 
 
 
The aim of the CBM mechanism is to: 
 
strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence 
in the implementation of its provisions… in order to prevent or reduce 
the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to 
improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities. 
 
The CBMs were launched at the Second Review Conference in 1986; 
procedures for the annual exchange of data were developed at the 1987 Ad 
Hoc Group Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts; and were modified 
and expanded at the Third Review Conference in 1991. Since this time, the 
mechanism and forms (A-G) have gone unchanged.  
 
Many States Parties have emphasized a need to review the CBM mechanism 
and consider proposals to improve its deficiencies. The introduction of the 
Implementation Support Unit (ISU), agreed at the Sixth Review Conference in 
2006, signalled a commitment by States Parties to strengthen the mechanism, 
as the ISU is explicitly tasked with administering the CBM process. Although 
the introduction of the ISU represents a significant step forward, there remains 
considerable scope for further improvement.  
 
A number of proposals and recommendations have been made over the last 
two decades by States Parties, experts, civil society groups and others to 
improve the CBM mechanism. These proposals and recommendations 
include calls to: 
 
1. Review the questions asked on the CBM forms;  
2. Improve the usability of the CBM forms; 
3. Modernise the reporting process; 
4. Improve national data collection processes;  
5. Make administrative improvements; 
6. Promote cooperation between States Parties; and  
7. Invite civil society groups and international organisations to play a role 
in the CBM process. 
 
This compendium provides a comprehensive review of these proposals and 
recommendations to support States Parties and experts to engage in 
informed and productive debate about the future of CBMs.  
 
The compendium was funded by the Political Affairs Secretariat of the Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to complement the 2009-10 series of 
CBM workshops hosted by the Geneva Forum and jointly sponsored by 
Germany, Norway and Switzerland. 
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1. Review the questions asked on the CBM forms 
 
 
A number of actors have suggested that the questions asked on the CBM 
forms should be reviewed and amended to address any perceived difficulties, 
ambiguities or gaps. It is believed that by making the questions asked on the 
CBM forms clearer and more relevant, more States Parties will participate in 
the CBM process and the information provided in the CBM submissions will 
be more accurate and consistent.  
 
Proposals to improve the quality of the questions asked on the CBM forms 
typically suggest implementing one or more of the following changes: (1) 
clarify an existing question or form; (2) add an additional question or form; (3) 
remove an existing question or form.  
 
Although a number of modifications have been proposed, many actors seem 
to agree that the current forms cannot easily be ‘slimmed down’ and still retain 
their descriptive value; nor can they be substantially ‘bulked up’, as more 
lengthy or intrusive questions could potentially deter States Parties from 
participating in the CBM process. With this in mind, proposals tend towards 
subtle modifications, recommending improved clarity and precision over 
sweeping reform. 
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Form 0: Declaration form on ‘Nothing to Declare’ or ‘Nothing New to 
Declare’ for use in the information exchange 
 
 
Form 0 is intended to simplify the reporting process, allowing States Parties to 
indicate upfront whether they have (a) ‘nothing to declare’ or (b) ‘nothing new 
to declare’ for each CBM measure.  
 
In practice, however, States Parties have found the wording of Form 0 
confusing, resulting in incomplete and/or inaccurate submissions. Moreover, 
as the preliminary declaration can permit States Parties to provide no 
information (i.e. ‘nothing to declare’ or ‘nothing new to declare’ boxes are 
ticked for each measure), ambiguities in this form are particularly damaging to 
the outcome of the CBM process. Table 1 outlines proposals to redesign and 
clarify this form.  
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006  
• Clarify ‘nothing to declare’ or ‘nothing new to declare’  
• Redesign format along similar lines as the following: Does your country have 
anything to declare this year on Measure A, part I? (a) Yes, it has something 
to declare in this form for the first time (please complete form); (b) Yes, it has 
previously declared something in this form, and needs to update or modify 
details (please complete form); (c) Yes, but this information has already been 
declared since [year] and has not changed; (no need to complete form); (d) 
No, it has nothing at all to declare on this form 
• Repeat these four questions for each of the forms (A-G)  
Research Group for 
Biological Arms Control 
(RGBAC), Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
 
• Change title to read: ‘Exchange of general information and overview of 
submitted data’ 
• Redesign format along similar lines as the following: (a) Yes, a declaration is 
made and is the only valid information for this topic; (b) No, a declaration is 
not made, information submitted in the year ‘x’ remains valid; (c) No, there is 
nothing to declare 
• Request date of entry into force of the Convention 
• Request national CBM contact point 
• Request information on presence of national biological defence programme 
• Include relevant section of Form 0 at the start of each subsequent form 
 
Table 1: Proposed modifications to Form 0 
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Form A1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories 
 
 
Form A1 requests that States Parties exchange information on “research 
centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety 
standards” or “specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the 
Convention”.  
 
Due to the dual-use potential of high containment laboratories, Form A1 is 
considered particularly important to establishing transparency and building 
trust between States Parties. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Form 
A1, a number of proposals have been made to explicitly clarify its wording, 
particularly with regard to ‘directly related to the Convention’, and to focus 
questions on maximum containment laboratories. Table 2 outlines proposals 
that seek to achieve these aims.  
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
 
 
• Define ‘directly related to the Convention’ 
• Change wording to include facilities which are not ‘specialized’ but which are 
‘involved in’ activities that are directly related to the Convention 
• Provide an opportunity to state that ‘there are no, or no further, research 
centres or laboratories within or outside the territory of the reporting State 
Party’ 
• Request that States Parties declare where protective encapsulating suits are 
being used with Risk Group III and IV biological agents and toxins 
• Request States Parties declare where research with specific organisms is 
being carried out in biosafety level 2 (BSL2) facilities 
The USSR 
BWC/CONF.III/17   
24 September 1991 
• Request information on laboratory safety rules in force at the facility, including 
those with vaccinations, observation and quarantines   
 
Hungary 
BWC/CONF.III/17   
24 September 1991 
• Request information on equipment and materials used in declared facilities  
 
The Netherlands 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/6 
29 June 1995 
• Make this form mandatory within legally binding instrument 
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference, 
September 1996 
• Clarify need to include information on all facilities with maximum containment 
laboratories 
• Omit ‘research’ from the title and insert ‘including research facilities’ at the end 
of the title  
South Africa 
BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1 
16 November 2001 
• Request information on high security facilities that handle and work with 
Group IV animal pathogens 
• As a basis for consideration, South Africa has prepared an amended text 
describing the modalities for CBM A  
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Limit form to maximum containment research facilities 
• Request publication list and information on publication policy for declared 
facility 
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006 
• Clarify need to include BSL4 laboratories, while not restricting States Parties 
from including other laboratories that meet very high safety standards 
 
Table 2: Proposed modifications to Form A1 
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Form A2: Exchange of information on national biological defence 
research and development programmes 
 
 
Form A2 is critical to the success of the information exchange, as this form 
requires that States Parties provide a detailed account of biodefence 
activities, staffing, infrastructure, funding, related publications and publication 
policies.  
 
Although Form A2 has been commended for its semi-open question format, 
which allows States Parties to elaborate on their biodefence programmes, a 
number of proposals have been made to broaden its scope and to make the 
questions asked more relevant. This would allow States Parties to explore at 
greater length the most significant issues to the BWC. Table 3 outlines 
proposals that seek to achieve these aims.   
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
Hungary 
BWC/CONF.III/17   
24 September 1991 
• Request that States Parties declare whether or not training of defence against 
biological warfare is practised in the armed forces and encourage exchange 
visits to observe biodefence exercises 
• Encourage direct communication between facilities (e.g. request telephone 
and fax numbers of facilities declared in national report)  
The Netherlands 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/6 
29 June 1995 
• Make this form mandatory within legally binding instrument 
 
 
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference, 
September 1996 
• Broaden the focus of Form A2 to include all aspects of biodefence programme 
• Omit ‘research and development’ from the title and insert ‘including research 
programmes’ at the end of the title 
Hunger and Isla, HCBAC, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Form A2 (iii) is confusing and needs to be amended 
• Unclear whether the total number of personnel working at biodefence facility 
should include or exclude the number of contractor staff 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Change title to read: ‘Exchange of information on national biological defence 
programmes’ 
• Move Form A2 (i) to Form 0 
• Clarify declaration requirement for Form A2 (iii) requiring any facility with more 
than 50% of its total finances devoted to biodefence to be declared 
• List all other facilities involved in biodefence programmes in Form A2 (ii) 
• Expand Form A2 (iii) paragraphs (viii) and (ix) to include not only publications 
but all forms of research results 
• Request information on the promotion of contacts between scientists such as 
conferences, symposia and seminars organised at declared facility 
• Add Form A2 (iv) requesting information on military vaccination programmes, 
military biodefence training exercises and any other relevant information  
Pugwash Study Group, 
Hart, Discussion Paper, 
November 2008 
• Develop guidelines for describing the level of funding and general type of 
activity in biodefence relevant activities 
 
Lentzos, Preparing the 
Ground for the CBM 
Content Debate, Swiss-
Funded Study, 
December 2008 
 
• Add reference points to existing questions, including: proportion of defence 
budget spent on biodefence rather than biodefence figure alone; distribution of 
scientists according to disciplines rather than disciplines represented; number 
of facilities dealing with highly dangerous pathogens and number of personnel 
involved rather than the square-meters of BSL2, BSL3 and BSL4 laboratories 
• Add new questions, including: whether aerosol testing is carried out; number 
and species of animals used in biodefence research per year; proportion of 
open source to internal/restricted publications at facility 
 
Table 3: Proposed modifications to Form A2 
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Form B: Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases 
and similar occurrences caused by toxins 
 
 
Form B requests that States Parties provide information on disease outbreaks 
that “deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or 
time of occurrence”.  
 
Although potentially a very useful form, as an unusual disease outbreak could 
point to an intentional or unintentional biosecurity breach, Form B has been 
criticized for focusing exclusively on human diseases; providing insufficient 
information on the specific biological agents and diseases of interest to the 
BWC; and for overlapping with the mandate of the World Health Organization 
(WHO). These deficiencies are further complicated by the fact that the 
information submitted in Form B tends to be inaccurate and incomplete. Table 
4 outlines proposals to improve this form.  
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
 
• List groups of biological and toxin agents that must be taken into account 
when reporting on facilities and outbreaks 
• Request information regarding vector research, unusual vector occurrences, 
and the occurrence of vectors harbouring Risk Group III and IV agents 
• Include toxins more specifically in modalities 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.12, ed. Lundin, 1991 
• Request information on infectious animal and plant pathogen research and 
unusual outbreaks of animal and plant diseases caused by pathogens/toxins 
• Request information on vector research and unusual vector occurrences  
The USSR 
BWC/CONF.III/17  
24 September 1991 
• Discontinue the exchange of information on unusual outbreaks of infectious 
disease, this data is already presented by each State Party to the WHO 
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference, 
September 1996 
• Remove Form B, eliminating unnecessary duplication in reporting outbreaks, 
while encouraging States Parties to continue to make declarations of disease 
outbreaks to the WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
• Clarify diseases to be declared and what features make an outbreak ‘unusual’ 
The European Union  
BWC/CONF.V/COW/1  
13 December 2001 
• Request information on outbreaks of contagious animal and plant pathogens 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Remove Form B or expand it to include information on animal and plant 
diseases 
RGBAC, Zmorzynska, 
Occasional Paper No.4, 
December 2007 
• Remove possibility of ticking ‘nothing to declare’ or ‘nothing new to declare’ in 
Form 0, as there is always something to declare, be it the presence or 
absence of a disease 
• Require a new declaration each year 
• List specific human, animal and plant diseases for which information must be 
provided, while not restricting States Parties from reporting other diseases 
• If no case numbers are provided, request why this is the case  
• Request information on events of biosecurity concern, such as accidents in 
biodefence laboratories and incidents with weaponised biological material 
• As basis for consideration, the RGBAC has prepared an amended Form B 
RGBAC, Statement to 
States Parties,  
December 2007 
• Limit Form B to serious biosecurity related events such as bioweapons 
attacks and biodefence laboratory accidents 
• Use the WHO for routine disease data collection 
 
Table 4: Proposed modifications to Form B 
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Form C: Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use 
of knowledge 
 
 
Form C encourages States Parties to make the results of research in the life 
sciences, particularly research that is directly related to the Convention, 
unclassified and requests that States Parties provide information on relevant 
publications and publication policies.  
 
Form C, as a means of promoting the open exchange of knowledge between 
States Parties, has the potential to be a highly valuable tool. The form, 
however, has been criticized for being impractical and lacking focus. It is often 
considered unfeasible for a State Party to provide an exhaustive list of 
publications and the information contained in many publications lacks 
relevance to the Convention. Table 5 outlines proposals that seek to address 
these deficiencies.    
  
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference, 
September 1996 
• Limit scope to publications produced as a result of defence-funded work 
(including both work carried out at Ministry of Defence facilities and carried out 
under contract in academic and industrial facilities) 
• As a basis for consideration, Hunger has prepared a redesigned Form C 
Chevrier and Hunger, 
Nonproliferation Review 
Vol.7 No.3, 2000 
• Make surveillance of publications the responsibility of the BWC and not an 
obligation for States Parties 
• Invest in sufficient staff within the BWC to survey publications through publicly 
available sources 
The European Union  
BWC/CONF.V/COW/1  
13 December 2001 
• Make form more focused and effective 
 
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006 
• Make a clear distinction between ‘publications’ and ‘policy regarding 
publication’, requesting ‘publications of research centres and laboratories 
covering area of CBMs’ and ‘policy regarding the publication of results of 
biological research’ 
Hunger and Isla, HCBAC, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Limit publication lists to works of particular relevance to the Convention 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Remove Form C and request publication list and information on publication 
policy for declared facility in Form A1 and Form A2 (iii) instead 
• If the aim is to provide an indication of activities carried out at a facility, 
request other forms of research such as presentations, seminar papers, 
posters, patents and any other product coming out of relevant activities 
Lentzos and Woodward, 
National Data Collection 
Processes for Submissions, 
Swiss-Funded Study, 
December 2007 
• States Parties cannot be expected to list all publications 
 
Table 5: Proposed modifications to Form C 
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Form D: Active promotion of contacts 
 
 
Form D requests that States Parties provide information on planned 
international conferences, seminars, symposia and other opportunities for 
mutual exchange and collaboration between researchers in the life sciences.  
 
As part of the overall aim of the CBMs, cooperation between researchers 
goes a long way towards building trust between States Parties through shared 
research experiences. There is some concern, however, that the 
effectiveness of this measure is diminished by the fact that States Parties 
receive insufficient advance notice of upcoming events; there is some 
confusion regarding whom to contact regarding opportunities for exchange; 
and there should be a stronger focus on defence-funded projects. Table 6 
outlines proposals that seek to make Form D more explicit in regard to this 
information. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
• Request information on planned defence-funded conferences and meetings 
Hunger, Key Points for the 
Fourth Review Conference, 
September 1996 
• Request that States Parties provide advance notice on conferences and 
related scientific contacts 
• Encourage them to provide an address for obtaining further information and 
for applying to participate  
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006 
• Include two headings: ‘past seminars’ and ‘planned seminars’ 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Remove Form D and request information on past events in Form A2 (iii) 
instead 
• Encourage States Parties to inform the United Nations Department of 
Disarmament Affairs (DDA) about relevant planned events 
• Encourage the DDA to publicise upcoming events on its website 
 
Table 6: Proposed modifications to Form D 
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Form E: Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures 
 
 
Form E requests that States Parties provide information on legislation, 
regulations and other steps that their countries have taken to implement the 
BWC.  
 
This form is considered critical to the success of the CBM regime as it 
provides States Parties with an opportunity to describe concrete actions taken 
to stop the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and general 
misuse of infectious biological agents and toxins. Form E, however, is 
believed by many to be incomplete and in need of updating to include 
information on dual-use equipment and knowledge, codes of conduct, health 
and safety measures and bioterrorism prevention. Table 7 outlines proposals 
to expand Form E to include this information. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
The European Union  
BWC/CONF.V/COW/1  
13 December 2001 
• Request information on transfer of microorganisms and toxins and related 
legislation, regulation and procedures, as well as transfer of dual-use 
equipment, health and safety issues and penal legislation 
Pugwash Study Group, 
Roffey, Discussion Paper, 
December 2004 
• Summarize situation concerning national implementation measures and 
propose further measures as appropriate 
The United States 
BWC/CONF.VI/3 
6 December 2006 
• Request that States Parties include information regarding efforts to adopt 
national legislation within their CBM declarations 
• Request that States Parties adopt and enforce appropriate, effective laws and 
measures, such as export and border controls, to prevent non-state actors 
from acquiring and manufacturing WMD or related materials 
Hunger and Isla, HCBAC, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Add a question on bioterrorism 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Expand Form E to cover measures aimed at preventing bioterrorism and the 
adoption and use of codes of conduct for life scientists 
• Expand declaration requirement on export and import measures to cover not 
only microorganisms and toxins, but also equipment and knowledge 
 
Table 7: Proposed modifications to Form E 
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Form F: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive 
biological research and development programmes 
 
 
Form F requests that States Parties declare when they entered the 
Convention and declare information regarding past bioweapons and/or 
biodefense programmes.  
 
The importance of this measure, as a means of establishing transparency 
between States Parties, has motivated proposals to make Form D more 
comprehensive, requesting more specific information from States Parties and 
encouraging more frequent and more open discussion on past 
offensive/defensive activities. States Parties that are known to have had 
programmes, but who have not yet declared them, are encouraged to do so. 
States Parties that have made declarations are encouraged to update this 
information on a regular basis. Table 8 provides a summary of these 
proposals. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
The Netherlands 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/6 
29 June 1995 
• Make this form mandatory within legally binding instrument 
 
 
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference,  
September 1996 
• Broaden scope of Form F to include all aspects of past national bioweapons 
and/or biodefence programmes 
HCBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.1, June 2006 
• Encourage countries who are known to have had offensive programmes, yet 
have not declared them, to do so 
• Maintain open answer format to encourage countries to provide any and all 
relevant information  
• Provide specific points of interest to ensure comprehensive disclosure of past 
activities 
• Encourage regular discussion on past activities and create a suitable forum 
for such discussion to occur 
Hunger and Isla, HCBAC, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Introduce more detailed questions on categories of activities undertaken and 
on agents and facilities 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No. 3, March 2007 
• Change title to read: ‘Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or 
defensive biological weapons programmes’ 
• Move question on entry into force of the Convention to Form 0 
• Request more specific information on facilities, activities, organisms and 
military doctrine 
• Make updates obligatory at least every five years 
Pugwash Study Group, 
Hart, Discussion Paper, 
November 2008 
• Clarify past defensive and offensive biological weapons programmes (perhaps 
partly through the tabling of national papers that reflect additional archival 
research from a suitably distant period, such as prior to 1 January 1946 and 
the end of the Cold War could be another, eventual ‘end point’ cut-off date) 
 
Table 8: Proposed modifications to Form F 
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Form G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities 
 
 
Form G requests that States Parties provide information on human vaccine 
production facilities, including the name of the facility, its address and a 
general description of the diseases that are vaccinated against at the facility.  
 
Form G has been criticized for being incomplete due to the fact that animal 
vaccine facilities, as well as facilities that produce biocontrol agents and plant 
inoculants, use much of the same equipment and technology and many of the 
same processes as human vaccine production facilities. This gap in Form G 
has motivated proposals to broaden the form to include questions that request 
this missing information. Table 9 provides a summary of these proposals.  
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
Finland 
BWC/CONF.III/17  
24 September 1991 
• Request information on all facilities producing vaccines against toxins and/or 
pathogenic microorganisms whether for human or animal use, excluding very 
small production (e.g. production under 10,000 doses)  
Canada 
BWC/CONF.III/17  
24 September 1991 
• Request information on all institutions, both civil and governmental, producing 
vaccines for the protection of humans and animals 
The Netherlands 
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/6 
29 June 1995 
• Make this form mandatory within a legally binding instrument 
 
 
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference,  
September 1996 
• Request information on animal vaccine production facilities 
• Broaden required information to include all licensed and non-licensed vaccine 
production facilities 
South Africa 
BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1 
16 November 2001 
• Request information on animal vaccine production facilities 
• As a basis for consideration, South Africa has prepared an amended text 
describing the modalities for CBM G 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Change title to read: ‘Declaration of facilities producing human vaccines, 
animal vaccines, biocontrol agents and plant inoculants’ 
• Expand form to cover animal vaccine production facilities and facilities 
producing biocontrol agents and plant inoculants 
 
Table 9: Proposed modifications to Form G 
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‘Form H’: New forms  
 
 
A number of proposals have been made to add new forms that would extend 
the present requirements of CBMs. These forms (provisionally referred to as 
‘Form H’) would provide room to address new and evolving issues that could 
further enhance transparency and build trust between States Parties. In light 
of rapid advancements in biotechnology since the CBMs were introduced; 
increasing concern over the use of these technologies by terrorist groups; as 
well as the presence of previous measures that were proposed but never 
adopted, ‘Form H’ has a critical role to play in ensuring that the CBMs remain 
relevant over time. Although Table 10 outlines a number of proposals, these 
proposals should be thought of as a preliminary list to be added to as 
necessary. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
• Add prohibitions/provisions related to recombinant DNA research and military 
misuse of biotechnology 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.12, ed. Lundin, 1991 
• Add form that requests information on vaccine development and inoculation 
programmes of armed forces 
• Add form that requests information on military contracts directly related to the 
Convention 
Germany 
BWC/CONF.III/17  
24 September 1991 
 
• Add form that requests information on open-air release of microorganisms, 
viruses or simulants for the purposes of defensive threat assessment, testing 
of detection equipment and decontamination procedures/equipment 
• As a basis for consideration Germany has prepared a provisional form that 
requests information on every such release, including: the location and 
approximate area affected; type of microorganism, virus or simulant released; 
and purpose of release (threat assessment, etc.) 
France and Finland  
BWC/CONF.III/17  
24 September 1991 
 
• Add form that requests information on military vaccination programmes 
• Form would request lists of vaccines (agent/disease vaccinated against) used 
in ‘standard and/or regular peacetime vaccination programmes concerning 
active-duty military personnel, including conscripts, but excluding ad hoc, 
short-notice vaccinations for military personnel on special assignment (such 
as United Nations peace-keeping duties)’  
South Africa 
BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1 
16 November 2001 
• Add form that requests information on plant inoculant and biocontrol agent 
production facilities 
• As a basis for consideration, South Africa has prepared a provisional ‘Form H’ 
that requests information on name of facility; location (mailing address); and 
general description of products produced 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Add form that requests information on facilities undertaking activities involving 
the aerosolization of biological materials 
• Proposed title: ‘Exchange of information on biological aerosol facilities’ 
• As a basis for consideration, the RGBAC has prepared a complete set of 
revised CBM Forms, including a provisional ‘Form H’ 
Pugwash Study Group, 
Hart, Discussion Paper, 
November 2008 
• Maintain and strengthen the relevance of CBM formats to clarify possible 
threats posed by non-state actors 
• Revise CBM formats to better reflect scientific and technological 
developments to achieve a better understanding of the verification or 
compliance implications of industry and scientific research activities 
 
Table 10: Proposed addition of new forms (‘Form H’) 
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2. Improve the usability of the CBM forms 
 
 
There have been a number of suggestions to streamline the CBM forms and 
make them more intuitive or user-friendly. It is believed that such measures 
would make data entry easier and faster, thus helping States Parties complete 
their submissions and fulfill their CBM obligations.  
 
Proposals to improve the usability of CBM forms typically suggest redesigning 
their format, introducing more tables, tick-boxes, arrows and multiple-choice 
questions. Such measures, and similar simple modifications to the structure 
and layout of the forms, would allow collators to more easily navigate the 
forms and help standardize the reporting process. Other proposals suggest 
introducing guidelines and addressing the question of translation to facilitate 
completion by countries currently struggling to make submissions. Table 11 
outlines these proposals.  
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
• Request that the DDA translate CBM submissions into English 
The Royal Society, 
Scientific Aspects of 
Control of BW, July 1994 
• Design simplified CBM forms, requesting only essential information (e.g. 
under CBM A names of agents and work on delivery systems in defence 
programmes) 
Canada 
BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1 
10 April 2006 
• Develop user-friendly CBM forms, making greater use of tick-boxes rather 
than requiring written entries, helping to overcome language barriers 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.12 
20 October 2006 
• Review existing measures and their format 
• Develop guidelines for enhancement of their implementation 
• Examine the desirability of creating new forms with a more readable format, 
independent of the language in which the forms are presented 
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006 
• Expand use of multiple-choice questionnaires  
 
Switzerland in consultation 
with JACKSNNZ 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 
15 November 2006 
• Streamline forms, clarifying what information is required and where, and 
introducing simple measures such as arrows and tick-boxes to make it easier 
and faster to navigate forms 
South Africa  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.21 
20 November 2006 
• Develop new, user-friendly, CBM formats 
• Address issue of translation to ensure wider availability in all languages 
Switzerland  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.37 
8 December 2006 
• Make CBM forms user-friendly and minimise ambiguities 
• As a basis for consideration, Switzerland has prepared a complete set of 
revised CBM forms 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
 
• Introduce more tick-boxes, making answers more easily interpreted and 
minimising the need for translation, or provide a short translation guide to 
language used in tables, making interpretation clearer 
• Request that the UN translate submissions, or encourage States to submit 
their CBMs in more than one UN language or to make their national 
translations of other States’ CBMs available 
 
Table 11: Proposals to improve usability of CBM forms 
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3. Modernise the reporting process 
 
 
Building on proposals to improve the usability of the CBM forms, a number of 
proposals have been made to modernise the reporting process, encouraging 
the development and use of a comprehensive web-based information 
management system. It is believed that this measure would make data entry 
easier; standardise submissions; accelerate the circulation of information; 
make CBMs more widely accessible; and ultimately increase the quality and 
quantity of information provided by States Parties. Although the ISU has made 
considerable strides in this area (e.g. through the creation of a website 
dedicated to CBMs), further measures to integrate the use of computer-based 
online resources would improve the functioning of the CBM mechanism. The 
proposals outlined in Table 12 touch on some of the measures the ISU has 
already developed and introduces others that seek to further modernise the 
CBM process. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.12, ed. Lundin, 1991 
• Encourage States Parties to agree on measures to make the information 
exchange system more efficient 
 
Hungary 
BWC/CONF.III/17  
24 September 1991 
• Change structure of reporting system in order to make it easily adaptable to 
computerised data processing, providing for such processing and granting 
access to its results for each State Party  
Canada 
BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1 
10 April 2006 
• Distribute CBMs electronically through a CD-ROM or on a secure website 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.12 
20 October 2006 
• Make CBM forms available in electronic format 
 
 
 
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006 
• Introduce computerised CBM forms (with or without multiple choice 
questionnaires) that would allow for faster and easier circulation of 
declarations 
Switzerland in consultation 
with JACKSNNZ 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 
15 November 2006 
• Make CBM forms more accessible, working towards an electronic, web-
based, information management system 
• Adopt an electronic CBM tool for data submissions similar to Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) 
Hunger and Isla, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Provide choice over submitting and receiving CBMs electronically or on paper 
• Develop electronic database to help ease access to completed CBMs 
• Encourage States to make their CBMs freely available online 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Provide the opportunity to receive CBMs electronically 
• Send CBM forms directly to designated contact point 
• Distribute CBMs through an open or protected website 
Lentzos, Preparing the 
Ground for the CBM 
Content Debate, Swiss-
Funded Study, 
December 2008 
 
• Develop electronic submission forms and a user-friendly, web-based, 
information management system 
• Adopt electronic tick-boxes and pull-down menus to simplify data entry and to 
improve the visibility of key data 
• Adopt help functions and indicators to signal where to go next or where data 
still needs to be filled in 
 
Table 12: Proposals to modernise the reporting process 
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4. Improve national data collection processes 
 
 
The CBM data collection process can be difficult and time-consuming, 
particularly for States Parties preparing CBM submissions for the first time.  
 
Moreover, there are significant differences between States Parties in their 
ability to obtain the required information due to disparities in resources, legal 
powers and language requirements, putting some countries at an even 
greater disadvantage and contributing to chronically low levels of CBM 
participation and incomplete and/or inaccurate CBM submissions.  
 
In an effort to address these deficiencies, there have been a number of 
proposals to improve national data collection processes. Table 13 outlines 
these proposals, including calls to provide data collection guides; previously 
filled out CBM forms; and regional workshops on data collection and collation 
techniques. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
Canada Department of 
Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade,  
CBMs: A Guide to Their 
Completion, CD-ROM 
• Canada has prepared a detailed guide on CBMs, offering advice on how to 
compile data and making submissions available to States Parties for 
downloading 
• With this guide, Canada also includes their 2003 CBM submission, which can 
serve as a template for other States Parties to follow 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
• Encourage States Parties to establish national bodies and procedures to 
perform CBM duties 
Switzerland in consultation 
with JACKSNNZ 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 
15 November 2006 
• Improve national implementation to ensure comprehensive, regular and timely 
submissions 
 
Canada 
BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1 
10 April 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
• Encourage States Parties to submit CBMs on an annual basis, completed 
accurately and in a timely manner 
• Promote action on national implementation and encourage, in particular, the 
development of specific goals, time lines and methodologies to facilitate 
effective implementation 
• Encourage States Parties to report on their progress in passing national 
implementation legislation on a regular basis, such as at annual meetings  
• Encourage those in States Parties that are in a position to do so to provide 
implementation support to other States Parties 
Hunger and Isla, HCBAC, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Provide technical assistance to States that struggle with collecting declarable 
data, completing and submitting CBMs 
• Develop international and regional workshops on CBM reporting or an e-mail 
helpline  
• Focus efforts on ‘particularly important States’:  depositary States; countries 
that have had bioweapons programmes; countries that have been officially 
accused of biological efforts; and global and regional leaders in biotechnology 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
• Make CBM compilation assistance part of national or international efforts to 
strengthen the BWC 
• Encourage less experienced countries to monitor and follow the practices of 
more experienced countries 
• Promote international workshops that outline improved methods for data 
collection and collation 
• Introduce telephone or email hotlines to offer collection and collation 
assistance   
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• Develop a task group that could tutor data compilation in countries requesting 
assistance 
Lentzos and Woodward, 
National Data Collection 
Processes for CBM 
Submissions, Swiss-
Funded Study,  
December 2007 
• Encourage collators to help other collators, both those in States starting the 
process for the first time and those in States which have been submitting 
returns for some time but who may have specific questions on ways to 
improve data collection  
Switzerland  
BWC/MSP/2007/WP.11 
7 January 2008;  
BWC/MSP/2008/MX/WP.5 
30 July 2008 
• Promote improved collator rotation through use of up-to-date handover notes 
and close working relationships between predecessors/successors and 
technical experts  
• Develop guides on how to complete forms; provide copies of previously filled 
out forms; translate forms into the national language to avoid language 
problems; visit premises in person; hold seminars on a regular or one-off 
basis, etc.  
 
Table 13: Proposals to improve national data collection processes 
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5. Make administrative improvements 
 
 
Since the inauguration of the CBM mechanism, there has been a number of 
proposals to establish an administrative task force to facilitate the CBM 
information exchange.  
 
Some of these proposals have now been realized in the Implementation 
Support Unit (ISU), which was officially launched on 20 August 2007. The ISU 
is mandated to assist States Parties in the following ways: (a) receive and 
distribute CBMs; (b) send information notices regarding annual submissions; 
(c) compile and distribute data on CBMs and CBM participation; (d) develop 
and maintain a secure website on CBMs; (e) serve as an information 
exchange point for assistance related to the preparation of CBMs; and (f) 
facilitate activities to promote participation in the CBM process.  
 
Table 14 outlines proposals that led to or further encourage the work of the 
ISU. Although elements of these proposals have now been satisfied, taken 
together they suggest a strong interest in a more permanent CBM 
administrative task force. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
Yugoslavia  
BWC/CONF.III/17   
24 September 1991 
• Establish a unit of the UN secretariat that would follow-up on the fulfillment of 
States Parties’ CBM obligations  
 
The Royal Society, 
Scientific Aspects of 
Control of Biological 
Weapons, July 1994 
 
• Establish an administrative office that would issue reminders and follow-up on 
non-participating State Parties; correlate information in relation to laying a 
basis for verification; receive and collate intelligence information if it became 
available; monitor open-source publications (CBM C); receive and analyse 
information on exchange visits between staff of appropriate institutes (CBM 
D); advise countries on filling in CBM forms; and circulate CBM submissions  
Hunger, Key Points for 
Fourth Review Conference 
September 1996 
• Request that the DDA perform all activities related to CBMs, including: 
collection, distribution and analysis 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.19, ed. Sims, 2001 
• Create incentive for States Parties to submit annual declarations by offering 
an annual review of CBM returns and additional compliance reports that is 
only open to CBM-participating States 
• States that do not make the 15 April deadline forfeit the opportunity to 
evaluate the quality and quantity of other States’ data 
Findlay and Woodward, 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Commission 
No.23, October 2004 
• Establish a CBM Unit to enhance support for CBM process 
Canada 
BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1 
10 April 2006 
• Establish BWC secretariat or implementation support unit to carry out specific 
activities, including providing enhanced support for CBMs in the form of 
reminders; assistance; and annual summaries 
France on behalf of the 
European Union 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4 
20 October 2006 
• Request that the DDA send out pre and post 15 April reminders 
• Invite States Parties to designate a contact point to which reminders can be 
sent  
• Request that the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) send out January reminders  
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Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.12 
20 October 2006 
• Establish a panel of governmental experts to assist in CBM duties 
• Provide assistance when requested in devising, presenting and implementing 
CBMs 
 
 
 
Switzerland in consultation 
with JACKSNNZ 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 
15 November 2006 
• Define stronger role for the DDA, allowing it to: raise awareness of States 
Parties and promote and explain the CBM system, jointly with States in a 
position to assist other States Parties; issue annual reminders to submit 
forms; act as intermediary between States requesting assistance and those 
offering assistance; verify plausibility of information submitted, clarify 
ambiguities and request missing pages; and provide basic statistics on CBM 
participation 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
 
• Create a permanent BWC task force, which will address all matters related to 
the Convention, including CBMs and CBM reform: provide a stronger 
collection mandate for the DDA, allowing it to issue CBM reminders and make 
inquiries and allow the DDA to conduct low-level (e.g. an annual participation 
summary), mid-level (e.g. a summary of the declared data reducing the large 
amount of information into several pages, which can be easily reviewed) and 
high-level (e.g. verification of information declared in CBMs) analysis of CBMs  
Pugwash Study Group, 
Littlewood, Background 
Paper, November 2008 
• Consider practical enhancements to the ISU in terms of staffing, mandate and 
outreach activities 
 
 
Table 14: Proposals to improve CBM administration 
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6. Promote cooperation between States Parties 
 
 
In keeping with the aims of the CBMs, and the implementation of the BWC, 
increased cooperation between States Parties stands to bring countries closer 
together; harmonize efforts to promote the peaceful and productive use of 
biology; increase transparency and build trust.  
 
Given the fundamental importance of cooperation, a number of proposals 
have been made to promote and improve contact between States Parties. 
These proposals are generally concerned with raising awareness of the CBM 
mechanism through bilateral and multilateral dialogue; regional forums; and 
other cooperative efforts that seek to promote the exchange of information, 
researchers, and best practices. Table 15 outlines these proposals in more 
detail.  
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.12, ed. Lundin, 1991 
• Take actions to enhance exchange of scientists on a long-term basis, 
especially between facilities involved in research directly related to the BWC 
Hungary 
BWC/CONF.III/17 
24 September 1991 
• Encourage States Parties, which are ready to do so, to open their declared 
facilities on a reciprocal basis to verify on-site the information provided in their 
CBMs  
BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP.85,  
26 July 1996 
• Promote the exchange of information between States Parties (BWC as “hub”): 
establish electronic networking on issues relating to materials and activities of 
potential relevance to the BWC; video conference connectivity/network to 
support information sharing; and ‘virtual’ attendance at scientific conferences 
BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP.86, 
26 July 1996 
• Promote voluntary confidence-building visits to demonstrate transparency in 
matters related to the BWC and to foster the mutually beneficial exchange of 
information and technology between participating States Parties 
BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP.87, 
26 July 1996 
• Encourage bilateral and/or multilateral visits of experts to comparable facilities 
between States Parties on a voluntary and/or reciprocal basis and 
bilateral/multilateral scientific exchanges where common interest exists 
between countries, covering all areas directly related to the BWC 
France 
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.55 
28 July 2004 
• Promote and improve international laboratory networks and cooperation 
France on behalf of the 
European Union  
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4  
20 October 2006 
• Encourage States Parties that are in a position to do so to support other 
States Parties that request assistance in returning their CBM forms 
Switzerland in consultation 
with JACKSNNZ 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 
15 November 2006 
• Raise awareness of States Parties and promote and explain the CBM system, 
jointly with States in a position to assist other States Parties 
RGBAC, Isla, Occasional 
Paper No.3, March 2007 
 
 
• Raise awareness with regard to the importance of CBM participation through 
regional promotional workshops and other appropriate events 
• Promote voluntary multilateral on-site validation visits  
• Encourage States Parties who wish to establish a precedent for cooperation 
and transparency to offer and attend visits of this kind 
VERTIC, Research Report 
No.6, October 2006 
• Take action to implement the BWC through regional forums initiated by States 
Parties 
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Littlewood, Canadian 
Centre for Treaty  
Compliance (CCTC), 2008 
• Encourage States Parties to provide assistance to other States Parties that 
are experiencing legitimate difficulties submitting annual CBM forms 
Pugwash Study Group, 
Hart, Discussion Paper, 
November 2008 
• Consider incorporating select consultation, clarification and fact-finding 
measures into the CBM structure (e.g. by agreeing to a political statement 
supporting a process of clarification among interested parties at the margins 
using such measures) 
 
Table 15: Proposals to promote cooperation between States Parties 
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7. Invite civil society groups and international organisations 
to play a role in the CBM process 
 
 
There have been a number of proposals to invite civil society groups and 
international organisations to play a role in the CBM process. Civil society 
groups are said to have the potential to contribute significantly to the oversight 
and development of the CBMs, as such groups are free to set their own 
agenda and could propose novel ideas towards the betterment of the CBM 
process. International organisations, such as the WHO, are said to have the 
potential to interface with the BWC, drawing on a wealth of epidemiological 
data and expert insight that could either substitute certain CBM measures or 
simply support CBM duties. Table 16 outlines a number of proposals that 
seek to incorporate the energy and expertise of each of these groups, 
enhancing the effectiveness of CBMs. 
 
 
Proposed by Proposed modifications  
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.10, ed. Geissler, 1990 
• Encourage international organisations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to participate in the CBM information exchange and announce 
forthcoming meetings, exchanges of scientists, etc.  
• Encourage scientists, universities and scientific societies to declare that they 
will not participate in offensive biological weapons programmes 
• Request that the WHO collect, evaluate and distribute data submitted by 
States Parties on containment labs and disease outbreaks 
SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
No.12, ed. Lundin, 1991 
• Request that information on facilities, outbreaks, conferences, publications, 
and exchange programmes be fed into a central database with the WHO, or a 
similar agency, which could be accessed by States Parties at any time instead 
of requesting information in voluminous and lengthy reports 
BWC/AD HOC 
GROUP/WP.85,  
26 July 1996 
• Promote the exchange of information between States Parties and international 
organizations (BWC as “hub”): monitor databases that track unusual disease 
outbreaks in humans (e.g. WHO Weekly Epidemiological Record); animals 
(e.g. OIE Disease Information); and plants (e.g. joint FAO/OIE/WHO 
questionnaire) 
VERTIC, Research Report 
No.6, October 2006 
• Liaise with other intergovernmental organisations 
Hunger and Isla, HCBAC, 
Disarmament Forum No.3, 
2006 
• Make electronic CBM database available to non-governmental experts to 
increase possibilities for CBM analysis and assessment 
Pugwash Study Group, 
Jefferson, Report,  
December 2007 
• Build synergy with other international organisations 
• Increase inclusiveness of academic and research institutions and NGOs 
• Improve transparency through open dialogue with industry 
Canadian Centre for Treaty 
Compliance, Littlewood, 
Compliance Chronicles 
No.6, July 2008 
• Grant civil society groups (including NGOs, professional scientific bodies, 
industry and other non-state actors) greater access to CBM information  
• Work with these groups to address problems with the CBM mechanism and 
consider possible solutions  
Pugwash Study Group, 
Littlewood, Background 
Paper, November 2008 
• Encourage civil society groups to start a collaborative website (e.g. a ‘Wiki’) 
that would permit them to think about and test various ideas, policy proposals 
and possible solutions that would help prepare the ground for a successful 
conference in 2011 
 
Table 16: Proposals to invite civil society groups and international 
organisations to play a role in the CBM process 
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Appendix C: Common Ground on Technical Revisions to the 
CBMs Based on Discussions at the 2009-2010 Series of 
Workshops 
 
 
The following suggested revisions to the CBMs reflect a best judgment of the 
common ground among participants at the series of workshops. It should be 
recognized that not all participants endorsed all of the suggestions made. 
 
 
CBM Forms: 
 
Form A, part 1 
• Retain this form. 
• Declarations under this form should cover facilities that fulfill the 
requirements set out for maximum containment (BSL4) for handling 
human and/or animal pathogens classified as Risk Group 4 
microorganims. To ensure the inclusion of all BSL4 centres and facilities, it 
should be clarified on the form that it is not limited to research activities.  
• Item #6 of the existing form should be deleted because some States 
Parties misunderstand this item, believing that they should declare BSL3 
and/or BSL2 facilities in the absence of BSL4 facilities.  
• Add a new item requesting a list of publications (this addition allows Form 
C to be deleted).  
• The footnote that defines the maximum containment requirement should 
be revised to refer to the latest version of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety 
Manual and should also include a reference standard for veterinary 
facilities, i.e. the relevant chapter from the OIE Terrestrial Manual. 
 
Form A, part 2 (i), (ii) and (iii) 
• Retain this form. 
• The declarations under Form A, part 2 should cover “any research and 
development programme aimed at the protection of humans, animals or 
plants against the hostile use of biological agents and toxins,” i.e. all state 
and state-funded military and civil biodefence programmes. 
 
Form A, part 2 (i) 
• Retain this form without change (except for the clarification mentioned 
immediately above). 
 
Form A, part 2 (ii) 
• Retain this form.  
• A question should be added on whether procedures and/or practices are in 
place to internally review national compliance with the Convention, i.e. a 
question on so-called “oversight procedures” for declared biological 
defence programmes. 
 
Form A, part 2 (iii) 
• Retain this form.  
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• Item #5 should be modified to clarify that “indoor” aerosol work is also to 
be included in the description of the biological defence work carried out at 
the facility. 
 
Form B (i) 
• Delete this form altogether. 
 
Form B (ii) 
• Retain this form.  
• Enable provision of links to national websites and WHO, OIE and 
PROMED websites where reports are published on disease outbreaks that 
seem to deviate from the normal pattern and that are considered 
particularly important to the Convention.  
• Questions relating to assistance and cooperation could be added as 
follows: 
- assistance requested:  yes / no 
- assistance received:  yes / no 
 
Form C 
• Delete this form altogether. 
• Move publication list to Form A part (i). 
 
Form D 
• Retain and revamp this form.  
• This declaration form should: 
- promote active contacts for cooperation; 
- report forward-looking events/activities that offer opportunities for 
Article X-related cooperation; 
- provide a platform for requesting and offering assistance. 
 
Form E 
• Retain and revamp this form.  
• Questions with yes/no answers should be added covering oversight 
measures, including but not limited to legislation, that capture activities 
identified during the intersessional process as having the potential to 
improve the implementation of obligations under the BWC, e.g. 
- biosafety 
- biosecurity 
- disease surveillance 
- codes of conduct addressing the “dual use problem” 
• Web links should be added to databases like the ISU Implementation 
Database, the 1540 Legislative Database or others where lists of oversight 
measures are available. 
• Add a question on the BWC national authority/ point of contact. 
 
Form F 
• Retain this form without change. 
 
Form G 
• Retain this form. 
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• Form G should be expanded to include the declaration of facilities that 
produce vaccines licensed by a State Party for the protection of animals.  
• Split form into: G (i) requesting the declaration of facilities that produce 
vaccines licensed by a State Party for the protection of humans; and G (ii) 
requesting the declaration of facilities that produce vaccines licensed by a 
State Party for the protection of animals. 
 
New Form 
• Given the proposed deletion of item #6 in Form A, part 1, a new form 
should be added for States that do not possess a BSL4 facility.  
• The new form should ask for the highest biosafety level implemented in 
facilities on a State Party’s territory handling biological agents and toxins 
(with a footnote referring to the WHO and OIE standards): 
- biosafety level 2 (BSL2):  yes / no 
- biosafety level 3 (BSL3):  yes / no 
 
Form 0 
• If nothing new to declare, the form should include a reference to the last 
year in which information was provided for a particular form.  
• The date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party should be 
moved from Form F to Form 0. 
 
 
Modalities of submission 
Based on the three modes of electronic CBM submission presented at the 
final workshop, the WEB 2.0 approach offers the best opportunity for 
information to be provided in both a static (fixed deadline) and a dynamic 
(updating) manner. However, the opportunity to make an electronic 
submission should not rule out the possibility of providing declarations in 
paper form. To allow the ISU to compile databases on: national 
implementation, assistance requested/offered, other activities declared under 
Form E, vaccine production, etc. a decision will need to be made as to what 
CBM information should be openly accessible and what CBM information 
should be held in a secure area of the ISU website. While open accessibility 
versus restriction of information may influence how the revised forms will be 
designed, a final decision on the mode of electronic submission is not 
required before the content of the updated forms is agreed.  
 
 
Assembling the CBM package 
• The CBM review process may also consider re-grouping the CBM forms in 
a logical way that covers three areas: 
- implementation of the BWC, 
- capacities and capabilities of a State Party, and 
- cooperation and assistance. 
• Clear and simple forms could contribute to making the CBMs a useful 
channel for requesting/offering assistance in the BWC context.  
 
!
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Appendix D: Workshop Series Participant List 
 
 
Representatives participated from the following governments, 
intergovernmental organisations, civil society and academic institutions: 
 
 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Canada 
Carleton University 
Chile 
Darmstadt University 
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Geneva Forum 
Germany 
Hamburg University 
India 
Iran 
Italy 
Japan 
London School of Economics 
Mexico 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Quaker United Nations Office (Geneva) 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Texas University 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
Vertic 
 
 
 

